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Article 2

The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause
Ned Snow*
ABSTRACT

The Constitution premises Congress's copyright power on promoting "the
Progress of Science." The word Science therefore seems to define the scope of
copyrightable subject matter. Modern courts and commentators have
subscribed to an originalist view of Science, teaching that Science meant
general knowledge at the time of the Framing. Under this interpretation, all
subject matter may be copyrighted because expression about any subject
increases society's store of general knowledge. Science, however, did not
originally mean general knowledge. In this Article, I examine evidence
surrounding the Copyright Clause and conclude that at the Framing of the
Constitution, Science meant a system of knowledge that comprises distinct
branches of study. This historically accurate meaning casts doubt on whether a
distinct group of expression may be copyrighted-namely, expression that the
First Amendment does not protect. I argue that the original meaning of Science
cannot support a constitutional copyright of unprotected speech.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution's Copyright Clause limits the scope of
copyright to works that "promote the Progress of Science." 1 The

1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . . "). This statement that the
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meaning of the term Science would thus seem important in
determining the boundaries of copyright protection. 2 To this end,
modern courts apply a purportedly original meaning of Sciencegeneral knowledge or learning. 3 Under this modern interpretation
of the original meaning, if the content of expression adds to
society's general store of knowledge, it is copyrightable. 4 And
because expression regarding any content adds to the general
store of knowledge, this interpretation of Science extends
copyright to all content. 5 Even libel, obscenity, and true threats
Copyright Clause limits the scope of copyright to works that "promote the Progress of Science"
is subject to disagreement. I address the different views on this issue in Part II.B.3.
2. Hereinafter, when I refer to the meaning of the term Science in the Copyright Clause,
I simply capitalize Science instead of italicizing it according to Chicago Manual of Style Rule
7.58. I treat references to the term useful Arts in the same fashion. Alternatively, when I refer to
a meaning of science that is not specific to the Copyright Clause, I do not capitalize science.
3. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) ("The 'Progress of Science,'
petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to 'the creation and spread of knowledge and
learning."'); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (explaining the public benefit of
copyright as "the proliferation of knowledge" which would "ensure[] the progress of science")
(citation omitted); id. at 243 (Breyer, ]., dissenting) (explaining undisputed premise that by
'"Science' . . . the Framers meant learning or knowledge").
4. This conclusion is apparent from the absence of any constitutional content
requirement for copyright protection. The modern Supreme Court has adopted only a
constitutional requirement for originality relating to Science. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (199I) (describing originality as the "touchstone" and "very
'premise of copyright law'") (citation omitted); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545, 546, 558 (1985) (explaining purpose of copyright as increasing "the
harvest of knowledge" and declaring that "original works" provide the "seed and substance of
this harvest"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 15I, I56 (1975) ("[T]he
ultimate aim [of copyright] is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity . . . . ").
5. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4; Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater,
604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that obscene content does not bar it from being
copyrightable); jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Belcher v.
Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, I088 (9th Cir. I973) (rejecting argument that false and fraudulent
material could not receive copyright protection).
In addition to courts, commentators have followed this interpretation. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 123 (1994) ("The term 'science' as used in the
Constitution refers to the eighteenth-century concept of learning and knowledge."); L. RAY
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 48
(1991) ("[T]he word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of 'knowledge or
learning."'); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 106 (2008) (describing overriding
purpose of promoting the "progress of science" as "broadly understood to include all products of
the mind").
That copyright lacks any content restriction does not imply that anything at all may be
copyrighted. Other terms in the Copyright Clause still limit the scope of copyrightable works
(e.g., Authors, Writings). See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. Works must still be fixed in a tangible
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add to the general store of knowledge; they accordingly would
seem copyrightable. 6
Or perhaps not. In the recent case of Wong v. Hard Drive Products,
Inc., the plaintiff argued that copyright cannot exist in obscene
works? The Won~ court ruled for the plaintiff, although it failed to
issue an opinion. In the absence of that opinion, the case raises an
interesting question: Does Science in the Copyright Clause
encompass expression that the Free Speech Clause fails to protect?
Recently, the Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder re-iterated the
seeming truism that Science in the Copyright Clause meant
knowledge or learning. 9 Albeit in dicta, the Golan Court's statement
reinforces the teaching that the original meaning of Science
contemplates all possible content in copyright.
This teaching lacks support from any scholarly examination of
the history surrounding the Copyright Clause. Legal scholars and
courts have never performed a thorough examination of Science's
original meaning in the Constitution. 10 They have passively accepted
the conventional interpretation of general knowledge solely on the
basis that it reflects the first entry for science in a 1786 dictionary. 11
medium and be original expression to be copyrightable. See id.
6. See cases cited supra note 5.
7. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 10-11, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc.,
No. 5-12-cv-00469-HRL (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012).
8. See Stipulated judgment, Wong, No. 4-12-cv-00469-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012).
9. 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012).
10. Scholars usually take this definition as axiomatic, without questioning its historical
accuracy. See discussion infra Part II.A (describing absence of analysis from authorities who have
given conclusion on meaning of Science).
11. Consider Justice Breyer's dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft. He explained the undisputed
premise that by '"Science' . . . the Framers meant learning or knowledge." 537 U.S. 186, 243
(2003) (Breyer,].. dissenting). To support this claim, Justice Breyer cited to a commentator,
Edward Walterscheid, who relied on the first entry for science in the 1786 edition of Dr. Samuel
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, where the definition of science is simply
"knowledge." !d. (citing EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002) (citing 2 SAMUEL jOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan et al., 7th ed. 1786))).
Walterscheid further noted two other commentators who posited this same meaning, again
based on Dr. Johnson's first entry for science. See WALTERSCHEID, supra, at 125-26 & n.46 (citing
Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48]. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 5, 11-12 &
n.l4 (1966); Giles S. Rich, PrinciplesofPatentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393,396 (1960)).
As a sidenote, the commentators referenced in this footnote do not specify which edition
of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary they rely on. See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra, at 125-26 & n.46.
Presumably, they would have relied on the 1786 edition, which is closest to the time of the
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Yet dictionaries of that time listed entries in order of a word's
development in meaning, so the first entry would have stated the
most primitive meaning-not the most commonly used. 12 To be
sure, the absence of scholarly scrutiny on this issue is remarkable,
especially given its impact on the scope of copyright.
This Article analyzes the original meaning of Science in the
Copyright Clause. Based on evidence surrounding the Copyright
Clause, the Article concludes that the conventional interpretation is
anachronistically incorrect. The evidence suggests that neither the
Framers nor the public of that time would have ever intended such a
broad, and for all practical purposes, meaningless meaning of
Science. 13 The text of the Constitution, writings of the Framers,
colonial copyright statutes, case law proximate to the Framing, and
initial copyright registration records all make clear that this
conventional understanding of the original meaning of Science is
wrong. 14 All indicate a very different meaning-a powerfully
discriminating meaning-in the Copyright Clause.
The evidence indicates that Science meant a system of knowledge
comprising distinct branches of study. 15 To promote the Progress of
Science, expression needed to promote that system of knowledge. 16
For instance, a journal of lunar observations and an instructional
book on administering medicines (both published in 1791) would
have been viewed as promoting a branch of study, and so they
accordingly were copyrighted. 17 By contrast, in 1790, the New York

framing. In the end, though, it would not matter which edition they relied on given that the
original 1755 edition lists the same entries for science. See 2 SAMUEL jOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan et al., 7th ed. 1755).
12. Dr. johnson explained:
In every word of extensive use, it was requisite to mark the progress of its meaning,
and show by what gradations of intermediate sense it has passed from its primitive to
its remote and accidental signification; so that every foregoing explanation should
tend to that which follows, and the series be regularly concatenated from the first
notion to the last.
I jOHNSON, supra note 11, at preface page 6. See also discussion infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing four
other entries found in Dr. johnson's Dictionary).
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part lli.D.2.
17. In 1791, William Waring registered the following book for federal copyright
protection, entitled:
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Magazine's monthly stories of seduction would not have been viewed

as promoting a branch of study, and they accordingly were not
copyrighted. 18
This historical understanding of Science and its effect on
copyright raises the question of whether courts should continue to
view copyright as entirely content neutral. Certainly I do not propose
a return to the 1790 views regarding which expressional content
promotes fields of studies. Unlike in 1791, stories of seduction in
today's New York Magazine should fall within the meaning of Science.
Indeed, over the past two centuries American culture has come to
embrace most subject matter as sufficiently valuable to be worthy of
study. Yet one category of expression falls short-that which is
unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. 19 Devoid of any value that
would justify protecting its content from censorship, unprotected
speech does not appear to promote Science as that term was
originally understood in the Copyright Clause. Therefore, to the

A JOURNAL FOR LUNAR OBSERVATIONS, BY WHICH THE CALCULATION OF
LONGITUDE IS MUCH EXPEDITED; The MARINER being led through the
Operation BY A regular printed Form in each Page, HAVING ONLY To fill the Blanks
from the Nautical Almanac and proper Tables, as indicated by the leading Lines to the
respective Numbers: CONTAINING ALSO, IN THE SAME PAGE, Blanks for
calculating the LATITUDE from the MOON'S meridional Altitude. With Directions
exemplified, &c.
See jAMES GILREATH, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, at 5 Qames Gilreath ed. &
Elizabeth Carter Wills compiler, 1987) (hereinafter FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS]
(capitalization of words in title as originally registered).
Also in 1791, Doctor Nathan Dorsey registered for federal copyright protection his book
entitled: A NEW AND COMPLETE SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTIONS, FOR THE SAFE AND
SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICINES, IN THOSE DISEASES INCIDENT TO
MARINERS. See id.
18. In 1790, the year that the first Federal Copyright Act became effective, the New York
Magazine published in january a lurid story entitled, The Fatal Effects of Seduction. 1 N.Y. MAG. 22,
22-23 (1790). The next month, it published a similar story that set forth acts of seduction,
Edmund and Harriot. 1 N.Y. MAG. 86, 86-89, 137-39 (1790). In June, it followed up these earlier
stories of seduction with, The Country Squires's Revenge. 1 N.Y. MAG. 354, 354-58 (1790). None of
these stories, or the magazine publications, cited in note 18 are listed in the federal registration
for copyright protection-a requirement at that time for protection. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT
RECORDS, supra note 17, at 101-15; Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 3 (requiring registration
for copyright protection of publication). The decision not to copyright these stories lies with the
authors or publishers-not any government body or institution. Hence, the decision not to
copyright suggests an original public understanding of what was copyrightable and what was not.
See infra note 68 (noting the scholarly approach to deriving the original meaning of words in the
Constitution as an examination of the original public understanding).
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A.

264

The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause

259

extent that courts continue to rely on the original meaning of
Science, they should recognize that Science is inconsistent with
copyrighting unprotected speech.
This Article examines the original meaning of Science in the
Copyright Clause and concludes that the meaning is inconsistent
with copyrighting unprotected speech. Part II analyzes the modern
interpretation of Science. It observes several irregularities and one
fundamental error in the interpretive methodology of modern courts
and scholars. Part III conducts an inquiry into the original meaning
of Science in the Copyright Clause. It examines the legislative
history surrounding the Clause, analyzes the text of the Clause itself,
and observes evidence in the decades following the Constitution.
Part III concludes that Science meant a system of knowledge that
comprises, or derives from, branches of study. Part IV discusses the
implications of this more accurate historical understanding. It argues
that to the extent courts continue to rely on an original
interpretation of the Copyright Clause, unprotected speech must lie
outside the scope of copyright.
II. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE ORIGINAL MEANING
Modern courts, Congresses, and commentators uniformly
subscribe to a meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause that
purports to reflect its original meaning at the Framing. 20 That
purported meaning is general knowledge or learning. 21 More
precisely, authorities uniformly teach that Science at the Framing
was synonymous with possessing knowledge about anything, or
similarly, gaining knowledge about anything. 22 According to the
authorities, then, general knowledge or learning represents the
original meaning of Science that presently governs the Copyright
Clause. 23 Yet as discussed below, this meaning admits irregularities
in the hermeneutics of constitutional interpretation, which
ultimately call into question the accuracy of the meaning.

20.
21.
22.
23.

See discussion infra Part !I.A.
See supra note 3.
See supra notes 3-5, and 11.
See discussion infra Part !I.A.
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A. Authorities

Many examples illustrate this modern understanding of the
original meaning of Science. I give only a few. Modern courts treat
this definition as axiomatic. Most recently in the 2012 majority
opinion of Golan v. Holder, Justice Ginsburg referred to the meaning
of Science as knowledge and learning. 24 In 2003, Justice Breyer in
Eldred v. Ashcroft explained the meaning of Science as follows:
"'Science'-by which word the Framers meant learning or
knowledge . . . . "25 Lower courts have repeatedly articulated this
understanding, beginning with the Federal Court of Claims in 1973,
which declared that Science in the Copyright Clause "is used in the
sense of general knowledge rather than the modern sense of physical
or biological science." 26
Congressional understanding of Science seems to mirror that of
the judiciary. Senate and House reports in 1952 address the scope of
copyright protection under the Copyright Clause. Those reports both
state: "[T]he word 'science' in this connection [has] the meaning of
knowledge in general, which is one of its meanings today." 27 Also
indicative of congressional understanding is the current Copyright
Act. The Act fails to impose a content-based limitation on the
subject matter of copyright, which suggests an interpretation of
Science that is broad and all-encompassing, consistent with general
knowledge or learning. 28
Leading copyright historians have subscribed to this original
understanding of Science, although without offering a historical
analysis. William Patry has explained that Science in the Copyright
Clause refers to "the eighteenth-century concept of learning and
24. 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012).
25. 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer,]., dissenting) (citing WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11,
at 125-26). The majority in Eldred made similar statements in explaining that the public benefit
of copyright was "the proliferation of knowledge," which would "ensure[] the progress of
science." Id. at 212 n.18.
26. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670,683 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affdbyequallydividedCourt, 420 U.S. 376 (1975);
see also Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 614, 622 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
("[T]he use of the term 'science' [in the Copyright Clause] relates to copyrights and is generally
given its eighteenth century meaning of knowledge or learning.").
27. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 3 (1952).
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . ").
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knowledge." 29 Ray Patterson has stated that in the Copyright Clause,
"the word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of
'knowledge or learning."' 3 Craig joyce, Dotan Oliar, Malia Pollack,
and Edward Walterscheid-to name only a few-have all written
that Science at the Framing meant knowledge or learning. 31

°

B. Interpretive Irregularities

At first glance, the uniformity of this interpretation suggests its
accuracy. If everyone has subscribed to the same view, it must be
right. But on closer examination, the interpretation admits troubling
irregularities. Taken together, these irregularities suggest problems
with the uniform interpretation. They suggest a need for a
comprehensive examination. This Section summarizes those
irregularities.

1. First-entry fallacy
Where courts and commentators bother to cite authority for
their interpretation that Science means general knowledge or
learning, they most often rely on one particular source: Dr. Samuel
Johnson's 1786 Dictionary of the English Language. 32 In the Dictionary,
Dr. Johnson em~loyed five entries to define science. 33 The first entry
is "knowledge." 4 If courts and commentators do not explicitly cite

29. 1 PATRY, supra note 5, at 123.
30. PATTERSON & LiNDBERG, supra note 5, at 48.
31. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, at 125 ("The use of the term 'science' [in the
Copyright Clause] is straightforwardly explained by the fact that in the latter part of the
eighteenth century 'science' was synonymous with 'knowledge' and 'learning."'); Ootan Oliar,
Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's
Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.j. 1771, 1809 (2006) ("[T]he eighteenth-century meaning of
'science' was close to the meaning of 'knowledge."'); L. Ray Patterson & Craig joyce, Copyright in
1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.j. 909, 947 (2003) (equating Science with
learning and rejecting argument that Science imposes any sort of content-based restriction on
the subject matter of copyright); Malia Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from
Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension Act,
36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 376 (2002) ('"Science' means 'knowledge' in an anachronistically
broad sense.").
32. See supra note 11.
33. 1 jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated).
34. !d.
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the first entry, they implicitly must rely on it as support for their
conclusion that Science meant general knowledge, for the other
entries are narrower in meaning than knowledge. 35 Other entries
include "[c]ertainty grounded on demonstration"; "species of
knowledge"; and " [o] ne of the seven liberal arts." 36 Only the first
entry supports the all-encompassing interpretation of Science as
general knowledge. Therefore, the first entry in Dr. Johnson's
Dictionary, knowledge, appears to be the principal source for
interpreting the original meaning of Science to be general
knowledge.
The problem with relying on this first entry in Dr. Johnson's
Dictionary is that there is no reason to choose the first entry over any
of the other entries. Presumably, courts and commentators rely on
the first entry because a first entry often reflects the most common
usage of a word. 37 At the Framing, however, lexicographersincluding Dr. Johnson-listed entries in order of their development
in meaning-their chronological etymology-rather than any sort of
usage pattern. 38 So because Dr. Johnson listed five entries for
science, the first entry-knowledge-represented the most primitive
meaning at the Framing-not necessarily the most commonly-used
meaning. Hence, courts and commentators have committed a
rudimentary error in assuming that Dr. Johnson's first entry better
reflects the meaning of Science at the Framing than does any of the
other four entries. 39 Simply put, they don't know how to read a
dictionary-at least not one printed in 1786.

35. See id.
36. !d.
37. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED, at
xxxii (2d ed. 1987) ("[T]he most frequently encountered meaning generally comes before less
common ones. Specialized senses follow those in the common vocabulary, and rare, archaic, and
obsolete senses are listed last.").
38. See 1 jOHNSON, supra note 11, at page 6 of preface; supra note 12.
39. This interpretative error is, unsurprisingly, not the first instance where the Court has
incorrectly inferred importance of meaning from ranking of order in a dictionary. See Stephen C.
Mouritsen, Comment, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based
Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1926-37 (analyzing fallacious reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), where the Court premised the
importance or common usage of the meaning of the word carry on the fact that dictionaries listed
a particular meaning as the first definition).
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2. Widespread originalism

The modern interpretation of Science is further irregular in that
it reflects a uniform approach of originalism. Uniformly, everyone
looks to the meaning of Science at the Framing. Such an originalist
approach diverges from the interpretive process that courts and
scholars have applied to arrive at meanings of other words in the
Constitution. The process of evaluating constitutional policy in view
of circumstances that have changed since the Framing has informed
the meanings of searches and seizures, private property, commerce,
due process, establishment, and speech-to name only a few. 40 Why
not Science? In short, the approach to interpreting Science
represents an irregularity in that it fails to consider cultural
differences in time and relevant policy. 41 There is simply no
argument in case law or the literature that today's changed
circumstances or policy considerations require an evolution of
meaning in the constitutional construction of Science. Instead, there
is only one meaning that purportedly reflects the precise definition at
the Framing. Science is irregular in the uniform application of
originalism to arrive at its meaning.
This observation suggests that the meaning of Science should
perhaps reflect changing circumstances of society. Science may be a
word that contemplates an evolutive meaning, or at least it may
contemplate room for discussion on whether its boundaries might
change. This Article, however, does not offer that discussion. I
discuss that possibility elsewhere. 42 Here, I merely observe the

40. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 53, 63-65, 73-75 (1996) (discussing search and seizure); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 934, 969-81 (2000) (analyzing
the constitutional meaning of property); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-6, 1518 (2010) (discussing commerce); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2107-2110, 2131 (2003)
(discussing establishment); David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416, 141620 (2005) (discussing the definition of speech); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1082-90 (1984) (discussing due process).
41. For an interesting account of the originalist and evolving approaches to constitutional
interpretation, see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 9-32 (1998).
42. See Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to
Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212116.
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irregularity: uniform originalism. To the extent, then, that courts
and commentators continue to pursue an originalist approach, this
Article offers evidence of the original meaning.
That evidence is valuable in view of judicial and scholarly failure
to conduct any sort of historical analysis of Science at the Framing.
Most often they do not cite authority for the originalist
interpretation that they offer. Where they do cite authority, that
authority traces back to the first entry of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary,
completely ignoring the other four entries. 43 There is no discussion
of the cultural context surrounding Science at the Framing. 44 Nor is

43. With respect to Congress, the 1952 Senate and House report statement regarding the
meaning of Science fails to cite any authority for its interpretation of Science as "knowledge in
general." See supra note 27. With respect to the Supreme Court, other than the excerpt from
Justice Breyer quoted in note 11 above, the Court has never cited any authority when it has
equated Science with knowledge or learning. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). Justice Breyer's sole citation was to
one commentator, Edward Walterscheid, for his interpretation of Science at the Framing. See
supra note 11.
Commentators' interpretation of Science at the Framing is equally lacking. The extent of
historical support in the literature for the proposition that Science means general knowledge or
learning may be summarized in the citation by Edward Walterscheid, who cited to three sources
as support for his one-sentence analysis of the original meaning of Science:
(1) Dr. Johnson's Dictionary published in the latter 1700s;
(2) a 1966 law review article by Arthur Seidel, who reached this same interpretation in
three sentences, and for support, cited to Dr. Johnson's Dictionary definition for science, as well
as one usage by Thomas Jefferson and one usage by Lord Coke (neither of whom were present at
the Constitutional Convention), see Seidel, supra note 11, at 11-12 & n.14; and
(3) a 1962 law review article by Judge Giles Rich, who in less than one page interpreted
Science to have originally meant "knowledge in any field," relying exclusively on Dr. Johnson's
Dictionary for this interpretation. See Rich, supra note 11, at 396.
44. A scholar of science history, Professor Bernard Cohen, performed a comprehensive
examination of science's effect on the Framers in his book Science and the Founding Fathers. In that
book, he spent three pages analyzing the meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. See I.
BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 306-08 (1995). His analysis appears
cogent and consistent with the conclusions of this Article. Part of his ultimate conclusion,
however, lacks support. He concluded that Science meant "theoretical or general principles of
practice that are associated directly with useful inventions or that lead to economic benefits or
financial rewards." Id. at 308 (emphasis added). Certainly Science as "theoretical or general
principles of practice" is consistent with this Article's conclusion on the meaning of science. See
discussion infra Part III. But his conclusion that Science is directly associated with "economic
benefit" or "financial rewards" finds no support in either his analysis or this Article.
Nevertheless, the main point of Cohen's conclusion, which he made explicit, is that Science in
the Copyright Clause would have had a much narrower meaning than the broadest possible
definition of that time. See CoHEN, supra, at 308. This conclusion essentially contravenes the
modern interpretation of courts and commentators. One commentator, Edward Walterscheid,

270

259

The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause

there discussion of the legislative history surrounding the Copyright
Clause. Nor any textual analysis of the Clause itself. 45 Simply put,
the purportedly originalist interpretation of Science fails to draw
support from any rigorous historical inquiry.
3. Lack of meaning

The modern interpretation of the original meaning of Science
presents an additional irregularity in that it implies the absence of
meaning. A bedrock principle of constitutional interpretation is that
words should be construed so that they convey practical, effective
meaning rather than impotent surplusage. 46 To have meaning, words
should discriminate by setting the boundaries of their subject
matter. Yet an interpretation of Science that means general
knowledge or learning fails to set those boundaries in the context of
defining the purpose and scope of the copyright power. Any subject
matter may be known or learned. Indeed, even expressions of fraud,
obscenity, and terrorism give rise to knowledge and learning. So by
encompassing anything that can be known or learned, Science
encompasses everything. It discriminates against nothing. And an

disagreed with Cohen's conclusion, contending that Cohen was attempting to "read the
copyright provision out of the clause." WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, at 130. Yet Walterscheid
failed to cite any contrary evidence that Cohen's conclusion was incorrect. See id. Indeed, the
only reason that Walterscheid cited as a basis for disagreeing with Cohen was the fact that
Cohen's conclusion was "obviously at odds with the usual judicial interpretation." Id.
45. I do recognize, however, that one legal scholar did perform a historical inquiry of
sorts. Professor Solum derived a meaning from the Oxford English Dictionary, the 1790
Copyright Act, and one early case that considered its meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's
Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 47-53 (2002)
(concluding that the original meaning of Science was "systematic knowledge or learning of
enduring value"). Yet although he performed an admirable historical analysis, it was secondary
to the primary focus of his article, which argues against retroactive term extension of copyright
law. See id. at 3-4. Much more can be explored and analyzed that sheds further light on the
meaning of Science. See also Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57
UCLA L. REV. 421, 458 (2009) (contemplating briefly that Science could have meant either
"useful knowledge," "knowledge," or "learning").
46. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) ("When interpreting the
Constitution, we begin with the unremarkable presumption that every word in the document
has independent meaning, 'that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added."')
(quoting Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540,
570-71 (1840) ("In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its
due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word
was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.").
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interpretation that leaves words without meaning-without
discriminatory force-is irregular in constitutional hermeneutics.
Of course this irregularity would not raise concern if the phrase
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" (the Progress
Clause) were merely preambular in nature. 47 If the Progress Clause
were preambular, the meaning of Science becomes irrelevant. As a
preamble, the Progress Clause would not affect the scope of power
granted to Congress. 48 Hence, Science as meaningless surplusage
would not raise concern if the Clause itself represents meaningless
surplusage-a preamble.
Some argue that the Progress Clause represents just that-a
preamble of no effect on the grant of Congress's copyright power. 49 I

47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ").
48. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577-78 (2008) ("(A] prefatory clause
does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.").
49. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 1.03(A] at
1-91 (2010) ("(T]he phrase 'To promote the progress of science and useful arts .. .' must be
read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in
limitation of its exercise.''); Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths
Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 299 (2002)
(construing the phrase, promote the Progress of Science, as indicating mere purpose without any
limiting force on the actual power). Three federal circuits have adopted this view. See Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument "that the introductory
language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d
128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985) ("We agree with Professor Nimmer that although the promotion of
artistic and scientific creativity and the benefits flowing therefrom to the public are purposes of
the Copyright Clause, those purposes do not limit Congress's power to legislate in the field of
copyright."); Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985) (reciting its
precedent as relying on Nimmer for the proposition that "the first phrase of the Copyright
Clause expands rather than limits congressional authority"). The Supreme Court has employed
language suggesting that the Progress Clause limits congressional authority. See Graham v. john
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1966) ("The [Intellectual Property] Clause is both a grant of power
and a limitation . . . . Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.''). On the other hand, most recently in
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012), the Court re-iterated its position that individual
elements of a copyright regime need not "operate to induce new works" in accordance with the
Copyright Clause, but rather the regime as a whole should serve the ends of the Clause,
suggesting that the limiting force of the Progress Clause is weak. Compare Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212
("[W]e have described the Copyright Clause as 'both a grant of power and a limitation,' and
have said that the primary objective of copyright is to promote the Progress of Science.")
(quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-8) with id. at 211 ("[P]etitioners do not argue that the Clause's
preamble is an independently enforceable limit on Congress' power.").
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disagree. As an initial matter, I observe that the very presence of
Science suggests that it is necessary in defining the grant of
copyright power. 5 Certainly the Framers could have given Congress
the power to legislate copyright without mentioning Science had
they believed that copyright would promote Science as a matter of
course. But they did mention Science. And the presence of a word in
the Constitution presumptively suggests that the word is
necessary. 51 Furthermore, nothing in the text of the Copyright
Clause or the history surrounding that Clause suggests that Science
should be construed as superfluous. As a necessary term, Science
must define the grant. Its meaning must matter.
I further observe that interpretive consistency in the Intellectual
Property Clause suggests that the Progress Clause is not preambular.
The Intellectual Property Clause consists of dual grants of power,
i.e., copyright and patent, in the single clause. 52 The word Science
has been interpreted as applying to copyright and useful Arts to
patent. 53 On the patent side, courts have treated useful Arts as a

°

50. See Edward C. Walterscheid, "Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional
Limitatiom on the Patent Power, 9 j. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 326 (2002) (arguing against construing
the Progress Clause as preambular in nature because to do so would "render it meaningless,"
which effect would be contrary to a well-established principle of constitutional interpretation).
51. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect."). Cf. Heller, 554
U.S. at 578 n.3 (concluding that a clause should be construed as prefatory rather than operative
where "the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as
'whereas' clauses in federal legislation or the Constitution's preamble").
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ").
53. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 ("Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader,
Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the
progress of the useful arts."); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-93 ('The Copyright and Patent Clause,
U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: 'Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
the
promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings."') (ellipses in original); Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 ("[T]he
federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the
Congress 'To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries."') (ellipses in original); WALTERSCHEID,
supra note 11, at 116-18 (linking Science with copyright and useful Arts with patent); Solum, supra
note 45, at 12 ("[T]he structure of the Clause and its history of exposition makes clear the
parallel structure that associates 'Science,' 'Authors,' and 'Writings' with the copyright power.").
This is not to say, however, that Science does not inform the patent power. See Oliar, supra note
45 at, 468-67.
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limiting term. 54 The Court has explained in Graham v. john Deere Co.
that the phrase "promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts" exists as
a constitutional standard that "may not be ignored" and controls
patent validity. 55 So on the patent side of the Progress Clause, the
Court has indicated that the Clause limits the scope of patent. It
would therefore be inconsistent to interpret the copyright side of the
Progress Clause-i.e., that relating to Science-as preambular. 56 To
the extent that the term useful Arts requires utility or
nonobviousness in patents, interpretive consistency would mandate
that Science not be construed as a preambular introduction.
These observations of the Progress Clause are of course only
cursory in nature, and thereby insufficient to definitively establish
that the Progress Clause is not preambular. Yet others have
persuasively and exhaustively argued against construing that Clause
as a preamble, and I rely on their work. 57 They have argued that the
Framers intended the Progress Clause as an actual grant of power to
Congress, with copyright serving as the designated means for
exercising that power. 58 Professor Lawrence Solum has reached this
conclusion based on a thorough examination of the grammatical
structure of the Clause in relation to all the powers granted to
Congress under Article I Section 8. 59 His argument is that every
other power in Section 8 grants a power in the first clause beginning

54. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 ("The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may
not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.") (describing the
patent law as a "system which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of . . .
useful Arts"') (ellipses in original); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir.
1991) ("The utility requirement has its origin in article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which
indicates that the purpose of empowering Congress to authorize the granting of patent is 'to
promote the progress of . . . useful arts.'").
55. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 ("This [the phrase 'promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts']
is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light
that patent validity 'requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution."') (internal
citation omitted).
56. Cf Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright
Power, 9 MARQ. lNTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307, 318 (2005) ("Early on, the phrase was interpreted as a
limitation on both the patent power and the copyright power; while in the modern era it remains
a limitation on the patent power, but has not been treated as an equivalent limitation on the
copyright power.'').
57. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1810-16; Solum, supra note 45, at 12-25. See also Snow,
supra note 42.
58. See sources cited supra note 57.
59. See Solum, supra note 45, at 12-25.
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with "To," and so the Copyright Clause should not be construed
differently. 60 He rejected the contention that the Progress Clause
could be construed as a preambular introduction of the actual
copyright power, calling the argument "simply unsustainable." 61
Similarly, Professor Dotan Oliar has concluded that the Framers
intended the Progress Clause to be a limitation on Congress's
copyright power. 62 His analysis has a historical focus, examining the
textual transition from initial proposals at the Convention to the
ultimate language in the Copyright Clause, as well as the political
context of the time. 63
I agree with the ultimate conclusion of both Professors Solum
and Oliar: the Progress Clause is not preambular in nature. 64 I
further observe that if the Progress Clause is a grant of power, the
word Science must define that grant, and by defining the grant,
Science must set boundaries on the grant. This conclusion draws
persuasive support from Professor Oliar's historical work, where he
argues that the Progress Clause limits congressional authority. 65 I
therefore rely on the evidence and arguments of Professor Oliar for

60. See id.
61. Id. at 22-23 ("The erroneously labeled 'preamble' is actually the legally operative
grant of power.").
62. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1810-16.
63. See id. at 1771.
64. Modern jurisprudence of the Supreme Court does not definitively address the issue of
whether the Science Clause represents a limitation on congressional power or, alternatively, a
nonlimiting preamble. In Graham v.john Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, S-8 (1966), the Court explained in
a patent case that "[t]he [Intellectual Property] Clause is both a grant of power and a limitation
. . . . Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by
the stated constitutional purpose." This language suggests that the Court would view the
Science Clause as a limitation. The Court re-iterated this rhetoric in Eldred v. Ashcroft. 53 7 U.S.
186, 212 (2003) ("[W]e have described the Copyright Clause as both a grant of power and a
limitation, and have said that the primary objective of copyright is to promote the Progress of
Science.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet also in Eldred, the Court
employed language suggesting that the Science Clause might not be a limitation: "petitioners do
not argue that the Clause's preamble is an independently enforceable limit on Congress' power."
Id. at 211; cf Oliar, supra note 31, at 1831 (pointing out that because the petitioners conceded
the issue, the Court in Eldred did not decide whether the Progress Clause limits congressional
authority).
The Court made a statement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) that
might suggest its viewpoint on this issue. The Heller Court described the structure of the Second
Amendment as a division between an initial preambular clause and a subsequent operative
clause; that division, the Court stated, "is unique in our Constitution." Id. (emphasis added).
65. Oliar, supra note 45, passim; Oliar, supra note 31, passim.
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the proposition that the Progress Clause limits the scope of
congressional authority. Based on this premise, the meaning of
Science would affect the scope of congressional power to legislate
copyright. 66
Thus, as a word that defines the scope of congressional power,
Science must have meaning. Yet as noted above, interpreting Science
to mean general knowledge or learning would fail to impose any
practical effect on the congressional power. That interpretation
would leave the term meaningless in the Clause, offending the
normal cannons of constitutional interpretation.

III. THE MEANING OF SCIENCE AT THE FRAMING
These interpretive irregularities suggest a need to re-visit the
original meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. This need
extends beyond insulated academic circles, for the Supreme Court
routinely relies on historical evidence in construing copyright law. 67
This Part therefore examines several pieces of evidence to arrive at
the likely meaning of Science at the time of the Framing. It explores
the following: evidence of the general meaning of science at the
Framing (not specific to the Copyright Clause); the proposals for a
copyright power at the Constitutional Convention; textual
connotations implied by the verbiage of the Copyright Clause; the
first Copyright Act enacted in 1790; public records of copyright
registration during the decade following that Act; and an opinion of
an early Supreme Court Justice regarding the limitation of Science in
the Copyright Clause.

66. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1771. Related to this issue of whether the Progress Clause
is a preamble or a limitation is the issue of whether the Progress Clause applies to individual
works, or alternatively, only to the overall statutory regime of the Copyright Act. This related
issue I address in another work, and I conclude that the Progress Clause should apply to
individual works. See Snow, supra note 42.
67. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) ("[T]he Framers regarded
copyright protection not simply as a limit on the manner in which expressive works may be
used. They also saw copyright as an engine of free expression.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213-14 (looking to the practice of Congress "since the founding
generation" to determine legitimacy of retroactive extension of copyright term); Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994) (relying on views of centuries-old jurists,
justice Story and Lord Ellen borough, to craft modern fair use doctrine); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (reciting view of Framers in
applying fair use).
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These pieces of evidence indicate that the meaning of Science in
the Copyright Clause was narrower than the conventional
interpretation of general knowledge or learning. 68 The evidence
indicates that Science meant a system of knowledge that comprises
or derives from distinct branches of study.

A. A General Understanding of Science
The common understanding of science at the time of the
Framing provides a starting point for understanding the specific
meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. This Section examines
the meaning of science in both its historical context of the
Enlightenment and as portrayed by one of the most well recognized
lexicographers of the time, Dr. Samuel johnson.

1. The Enlightenment
In a general sense, science at the Framing encompassed the tools
of reason and experience, both of which had given rise to the
Enlightenment. 69 Through science, reason and experience had
yielded an organized method for understanding existence from

68. In examining the original meaning, I seek the likely public understanding of the word
as used in the Constitution at the time of its ratification, rather than the original intent that the
Framers may have had by including the word in the Constitution-although the latter intent
may inform the former understanding. As between the original public understanding and the
original intent of the Framers, the former represents the prevailing approach to an original
textual analysis of the Constitution. See generally Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 9 I GEO. L.J. 1I 13, I !3 I (2003)
(introducing constitutional theory of '"originalist' textualism" as "faithful application of the
words and phrases of the text in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time
they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted the text as
law"); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and
the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1307
(2009) (quoting Kesavan & Paulsen, supra, at 1132) (setting forth a constitutional interpretive
theory that requires an understanding of "how the words and phrases, and structure . . . would
have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those
words and phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and
linguistic community in which they were adopted"); Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and
Executive Privilege, 88 TEX. L. REV. 301, 323 n.143 (2009). Although I agree with the originalpublic-meaning approach, I draw upon resources indicating original intent in addition to those
that directly address original public meaning because the intent is relevant to the likely original
public understanding.
69. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 60.
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various perspectives. 70 Science unfolded the success of Francis Bacon
in exploring the power of empirical thought; Isaac Newton in
achieving an unsurpassable understanding of physics, natural
philosophy, and mathematics; and Carl Linnaeus in developing an
unheralded system of biological taxonomy. 71 Many more-Rene
Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and George Berkeley to name only a
few-had similarly achieved powerful explanatory theories relating
to different aspects of existence, all through the scientific tools of
reason and experience. 72 At the time of the Framing, science
represented the common trait of Enlightenment achievements-the
process that would draw upon reason and experience to explain
existence. Science yielded the Enlightenment.
The aspects of existence that science could explain at the
Framing were not limited to the fields of nature and physics. Science
at the Framing would have included subjects that dealt with human
motives and interactions. 73 That is to say, the explanatory power of
reason and experience in science would have been understood to be
capable of explaining existence from any perspective? 4 Science could
explain morality, government, and history just as well as it could
physics, biology, or botany. 75 Its general understanding would have
included the moral and ethical philosophies of Immanuel Kant as
well as the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.
The same processes of reason and experience informed both the
natural and the social subjects of science. 76 Insofar as reason and
experience employed an organized methodology for explaining some
aspect of existence, then, science was unbounded. 77

70. CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 130-31 (1953). For an interesting
summary of the influence of science at the time of the Framing, see Mark R. Killen beck, The
Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. I, 41-49 (2002).
71. See Killenbeck, supra note 70, at 41-49; COHEN, supra note 44, at 45-49, 57, 114-20,
147.
72. See generally S. MORRIS ENGEL, ANGEL!KA SOLDAN & KEVIN DURAND, THE STUDY OF
PHILOSOPHY (6th ed. 2008).
73. See RossiTER, supra note 70, at 440-41. For instance, Thomas jefferson wrote in a
1799 letter: "government, religion, morality and every other science." Seidel, supra note 11, at 12
n.15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 20 ("[T]he American nation was conceived in a historical
period that is generally known as the Enlightenment, or the great Age of Reason, and science
was then esteemed as the highest expression of human rationality.").
75. See ROSSITER, supra note 70, at 130-31.
76. See id. at 130, 133.
77. Relevant to the formation of the new government, influential thinkers at the time of
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Through the tools of reason and experience, science had yielded
a culture of liberty and freedom at the Framing. 78 In effect, the new
nation was built on reason and experience-a republic of science. 79
the Framing would employ scientific analogies to argue their positions on government structure
and policies. Consider a few examples. John Adams recognized the argument of James
Harrington regarding the similarity between political balance and biological life sciences:
Harrington argued that a bicameral legislature was like the two ventricles of the heart, each
legislative house performing different functions like each ventricle of the heart. COHEN, supra
note 44, at 21, 25, 218. James Wilson noted similarity between the common law and Newtonian
physics, characterizing both as the "law of experience." I d. at 38 (internal quotation marks
omitted). james Wilson believed that "[t]he cultivation & improvement of the human mind was
the most noble object" of government and society. l THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
of 1787 605 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (quoting Wilson at constitutional
convention). Thomas jefferson relied on principles of Newtonian physics in drafting the
Declaration of Independence. COHEN, supra note 44, at 116-22 (arguing that phrases in the
Declaration of Independence, such as "laws of nature" and "self-evident," allude to principles of
Newtonian physics) (internal quotation marks omitted). Madison and Hamilton employed
scientific analogies throughout the Federalist Papers. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 Qames
Madison) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (comparing liberty and faction to air and fire); THE
FEDERALIST No. 14, supra, at 87 (comparing states at the frontier to body parts farthest from the
heart that circulates blood); THE FEDERALIST No. 38, supra, at 242-43 (comparing the fragility of
America to a sick patient). Benjamin Franklin recognized the similarity between the scientific
method and democratic procedure, observing that both required pragmatism, free exchange of
ideas, and free inquiry. See RossiTER, supra note 70, at 133, 285-86. Such instances of scientific
metaphors in political writings suggest the value that the Framers placed on the explanatory
power of reason and experience as manifest in natural sciences while debating the social science
of government.
78. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 57. George Washington explained the connection
between science, knowledge, and liberty when he addressed the Senate in 1790:
(T]here is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of
science and literature. Knowledge is, in every country, the surest basis of public
happiness . . . . To the security of a free constitution it contributes . . . by teaching
the people themselves . . . to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that of
licentiousness, cherishing the first, avoiding the last, and uniting a speedy but
temperate vigilance against encroachments, with an inviolable respect to the laws.
First Congress, Second Section: President Washington's Address, in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904, at 115-16 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 1905).
79. Thomas jefferson wrote: "Science had liberated the ideas of those who read and
reflect, and the American example had kindled feelings of right in the people. An insurrection
has consequently begun, of science, talents and courage against rank and birth, which have fallen
into contempt." Letter from Thomas jefferson to john Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2 THE ADAMSjEFFERSON LETTERS 391 (Lester]. Cappon ed., 1959).
Jefferson similarly wrote:
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light
of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of
mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted
and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman Qune 24, 1826), in THE jEFFERSONIAN
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Given the role of science in the new democracy, it is unsurprising
that the Framers felt obligated to continue its proliferation. 80 Science
had gotten them where they were, and so its continued vitality
would seem essential to holding their course. They chose copyright
to fulfill that end. 81

CYCLOPEDIA 245 Gohn P. Foleyed., 1900).
And finally:
We have spent the prime of our lives in [granting young men] the precious blessing
of liberty. Let them spend theirs in shewing that it is the great parent of science and
of virtue; and that a nation will be great in both always in proportion as it is free.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Willard (Mar. 24, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
jEFFERSON 699 Gulian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
80. See ROSSITER, supra note 70, at 130 ("Science and its philosophical corollaries were
perhaps the most important intellectual force shaping the destiny of eighteenth-century
America, and the men of America were quick to acknowledge and eager to repay the debt.").
81. Why did the Framers choose copyright? The answer to this question indirectly
informs the meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. Instrumental reasons that the Framers
likely would have understood for enacting copyright laws at that time suggest the effects that the
Framers would have expected copyright to yield, which presumably mirrors the effects that they
would have expected the Copyright Clause to yield, i.e., the promotion of Science. Hence, an
examination into the reasons for enacting copyright laws in colonial America might suggest
contours that the Framers contemplated for Science in the Clause. That examination would
include instrumental reasons set forth in colonial copyright statutes and instrumental reasons
propounded by individual copyright advocates of that time. I briefly analyze these sources below.
Copyright Statutes
Reasons for enacting copyright laws at the time of the Framing are found in individual
state copyright statutes. Between 1783 and 1786, twelve of the thirteen states had enacted
copyright laws. See Copyright Acts of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, New
York, in COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 1 COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAW PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 1-21 (1973) (hereinafter COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS]. Delaware was
the only state that did not pass a copyright statute. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra, at 21.
The Framers were likely aware of these statutes, especially given that two members of the
constitutional committee that drafted the Copyright Clause-James Madison and Abraham
Baldwin-were themselves involved in passing their own states' copyright statutes. See E.
MERTON COULTER, ABRAHAM BALDWIN: PATRIOT, EDUCATOR, AND FOUNDING FATHER 43-44
(1987) (reciting history of Baldwin); infra note 108 and accompanying text. Of the twelve
statutes, eleven cited or alluded to instrumental reasons for enacting copyright protection. See
state copyright statutes of all but Virginia in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra, at 1-21. Those
statutes' reasons reveal two common themes-scholastic learning and improvement of
knowledge.
Among the state copyright statutes, the theme of learning in a scholastic or educational
sense is perhaps the most prevalent. Several states emphasized learning as a benefit of copyright
with respect to the sort of learning that a learned person has experienced, i.e., scholastic or
educational attainment. See Copyright Acts of Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island in COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS, supra, at 2-21. Referring to a person as learned indicates that that person has
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gained knowledge through study, not that the person has merely perceived a lot of information.
Were it otherwise, all persons who have lived sufficiently long to perceive a lot of information
would be considered learned. Hence, statutes that refer to copyright as existing to encourage the
activity of learned persons suggest the sort oflearning that is scholastic or educational.
References to this sort of learning are present in ten state copyright statutes. Connecticut,
Georgia, and New York each explained that copyright encourages men or persons "of learning
and genius to publish their writings." !d. at 1, 17, 19 (emphasis added). Massachusetts and
Rhode Island likewise linked copyright with "the efforts of learned and ingenious persons"; and,
similarly, New Hampshire linked copyright with "efforts of ingenious persons." Id. at 4, 8, 9
(emphasis added). Maryland portrayed the purpose of copyright as "for the encouragement of
learned men," and Pennsylvania similarly portrayed copyright as "for the encouragement of
learned men to compose and write useful books." Id. at 5, 10 (emphasis added). New jersey
placed perhaps the greatest emphasis on this sort of learning: "[L]earning tends to the
embellishment of human nature, the honour of the nation, and the general good of
mankind . . .. (M] en of learning who devote their time and talents to the preparing treatises for
publication, should have the profits that may arise from the sale of their works . . . ." Id. at 67 (emphases added). And although North Carolina never included the word learning in its
statute, it cited the closely related synonym, genius, as a product of copyright. Id. at 15. Thus,
learning in the scholastic or educational sense represented a prevalent theme throughout state
copyright statutes-referred to in ten of the twelve statutes as an instrumental reason for
copyright.
Knowledge also was a common theme among the state statutes. But not just any sort of
knowledge. Specifically, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island cited the improvement
of knowledge as a reason for copyright, and North Carolina cited knowledge that was useful. Id.
at 4, 8, 9, 15. None of the statutes referred to knowledge generally; all references to knowledge
were qualified accordingly. Thus, four state copyright statutes cited the improvement of
knowledge or the facilitation of useful knowledge as an instrumental reason for copyright.
Although the statutes included other instrumental reasons for copyright, most of those
other reasons represented direct effects of the sort of learning and knowledge discussed abovee.g., the production of literature; the progress of civilization; the public weal of the community;
the advancement of human happiness; and the promotion of useful discoveries. Only one
instrumental reason listed in only one state statute appears less connected to learning and
knowledge, and that is the promotion of commerce. North Carolina mentions commerce as a
benefit of copyright, but tellingly, it describes commerce as merely a "general extension" of
copyright, or in other words, an indirect benefit. See id. at 15. Hence, the fact that commerce
appears in only one of the twelve statutes, coupled with the fact that the one statute that does
cite commerce expressly qualifies its connection to copyright, suggests that commercial
enterprise would not normally be associated with a benefit of copyright at the time of the
Framing. Stated another way, copyright would not likely be thought of as a means to produce
any sort of expression that would promote commerce.
Therefore, to the extent that the Framers construed instrumental reasons for enacting
copyright law at the state level as corresponding with the stated reason for including copyright
in the Constitution-promoting science-science would seem to encompass the two common
themes of the state statutes: educational or scholastic learning and improved or useful
knowledge.
Copyright Advocates
Consistent with these two themes found in the state copyright statutes are arguments of
copyright advocates in colonial America. In 1782, during the Revolutionary War, Thomas Paine

281

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

2. The 1786 dictionary

Consistent with the Enlightenment's focus on reason and
experience, dictionaries of the time shed further light on the public's
general understanding of science. 82 Arguably the most authoritative
dictionary at the Framing was Dr. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the

addressed the issue of statutory copyright protection in his Letter to the Abbe Raynal. THE LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE: ESSAYS, LETTERS, ADDRESSES 182 (Daniel Edwin Wheeler ed.,
1908). He argued that literature would never flourish if not protected by copyright, and that
even though England and America were at war, literature was not "entitled to depredation." Id.
In a footnote to that comment, Paine explained:
[W]hen peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the country will deprive itself
of the honor and service of letters and the improvement of science, unless sufficient
laws are made to prevent depredations on literary property. It is well worth
remarking, that Russia, who but a few years ago was scarcely known in Europe, owes
a large share of her present greatness to the close attention she has paid, and the wise
encouragement she has given, to every branch of science and learning . . . .
Id. at 182-83. Copyright, as Paine observed, would allow for "service of letters" and
"improvement of science." Id. Copyright, he concluded, would serve as a means for "wise
encouragement" of "every branch of science." Id. at 183.
Perhaps the most influential advocate for enacting copyright laws in individual states was
Noah Webster. See HARRY R. WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA 53-59
(1966); FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xviii. He argued that copyright
proliferates useful knowledge for all citizens, and that this result was desirable to ensure a
successful democracy rather than a failed experiment in government. Id. Webster viewed
copyright as necessary for successful self-governance.
Another influential advocate for copyright was Joel Barlow. Barlow wrote the Continental
Congress seeking copyright legislation, and his letter ended up in the hands of two members of
that Congress-James Madison and Hugh Williamson-who later served on the constitutional
committee that drafted the Copyright Clause. Id. at xviii, xix. In that letter to the Continental
Congress, Barlow recognized a connection between copyright and "the sciences." Letter from
Barlow to Boudinot Qan. 10, 1783), in PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, item 78, 4:36970 (emphasis added). He argued that copyright was necessary in America because America
lacked an aristocracy, which in the European countries had enabled persons to devote their lives
to study. See id. Barlow thus viewed copyright as promoting the sciences in America because
copyright created an incentive, necessary in America, for the sort of studying that was performed
over a lifetime. See id.
Thus, instrumental reasons for copyright at the time of the Framing suggest a meaning
that the Framers would have expected from Science in the Copyright Clause. The state statutes
suggest that the meaning would be consistent with improvement of knowledge or useful
knowledge and learning that is scholastic or educational; the arguments of copyright advocates
suggest a meaning that is consistent with knowledge that enables self-governance and
knowledge that would result from a life of study.
82. Dictionary sources of that time, other than Dr. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the
English Language, are discussed below. See infra note 126 (observing entry for science in dictionary
of Thomas Sheridan) and discussion infra Part III.C.1 (analyzing entry for science in dictionary of
Noah Webster).
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English Language. 83 In his editions of the Dictionary leading up to the
Constitutional Convention, Dr. Johnson defined science as follows:
1. Knowledge.

2. Certainty grounded on demonstration.
3. Art attained by precepts, or built on principles.
4. Any art or species of knowledge.

5. One of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, logick,
arithmetick, musick, geometry, astronomy. 84
Dr. Johnson stated these entries in order of their progression in
meaning through time, their chronological etymology-the first
being the most primitive and the last being the most developed at
that time. 85
Because Dr. Johnson arranged word entries according to their
chronological etymology, the first entry for science-knowledgereflects the most primitive meaning, not necessarily the word's most
common use at the time of the Framing. As so many have done, it
would be incorrect to assume that Science in the Copyright Clause
must mean knowledge based solely on the fact that the first entry in
the Dictionary is knowledge. 86 The order of entry does not suggest
any usage pattern of the word. 87 Any conclusion that Science in the

83. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (employing Dr.
johnson's Dictionary to analyze meaning of word at time of Framing); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (quoting from Dr. johnson's Dictionary to arrive at meaning of limited in
Copyright Clause); Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 347
(1999) (Scalia,]., concurring in part) (quoting Dr. johnson's Dictionary to define enumeration at
time of Framing); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, at 125 (relying on johnson's dictionary for
meaning of Science at time of Framing); Rich, supra note 11, at 396 (same). Although I believe
there is better evidence than the Dictionary that speaks to the meaning of Science in the
Copyright Clause, I begin with it because it is the primary source to which scholars and judges
cite as determining the issue.
84. jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated). The quotation of the five entries for science
does not include the examples that johnson quoted from others who employed the term in one
of the five ways indicated.
85. Id. at 6 of preface (unpaginated); see supra note I2; see also RoBERT DEMARIA, ]R.,
jOHNSON'S DICTIONARY AND THE LANGUAGE OF LEARNING 54 (1986) (referring to the first
definition for science in Dr. johnson's Dictionary as a "primitive" meaning as compared to the
subsequent entries).
86. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.
87. See id.
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Copyright Clause must mean general knowledge because of the
primacy of the first entry for science in the Dictionary is simply
wrong. 88
Yet even if the first entry does not speak to science's usage
pattern, that first entry is still relevant in understanding a general
meaning of science at the Framing. Dr. Johnson's subsequent entries
for a word build upon prior meanings for that word. 89 Therefore, the
first entry for science should not be altogether ignored. Further
examination of that entry, and the four subsequent entries, is in
order.
Under the first entry, Dr. Johnson noted two examples that
suggest a specific connotation for his entry of knowledge. The
examples consist of a quotation from Henry Hammond that speaks
of "God's sight or science" as "seeing every thing as it is" and a
quotation from Joseph Glanville that refers to the "indisputable
mathematicks" as "the only science Heaven hath yet vouchsafed
humanity." 90 Both of these examples suggest the sort of knowledge
that cannot be doubted-God's sight and the indisputable nature of
mathematics. They suggest certainty of conclusion. According to Dr.
Johnson, then, science in its most primitive form meant the sort of
knowledge that results in certainty.
Dr. Johnson explained his second and third entries in a way that
further supports this understanding of certainty in science. The
second entry is: "Certainty grounded on demonstration." 91 This

88. See id.
89. See jOHNSON, supra note 11, at 6 of preface (unpaginated).
90. jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated) (emphasis omitted).
The quotation that Dr. Johnson employed from Henry Hammond is the following:
[I]f we will but conceive God's sight or science before the creation of the world to be
coextended to all and every part of the world, seeing every thing as it is . . . his
prescience or foresight of any action of mine (or rather his science or sight) from all
eternity, !ayes no necessity on any thing to . . . come to passe, any more then my
seeing the sun move, hath to doe in the moving of it . . . .
H. HAMMOND, OF FUNDAMENTALS IN A NOTION REFERRING TO PRACTISE 161 (1654) (emphasis
omitted).
The quotation that Dr. Johnson employed from joseph Glanville is the following: "[T]he
indisputable Mathematicks, the only Science Heaven hath yet vouchsaft Humanity, have but few
Votaries among the slaves of the Stagirite." joseph Glanvill, Scepsis Scientifica: or, Confest Ignorance,
The Way to Science, in AN ESSAY OF THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING, AND CONFIDENT OPINION 142
Qohn Owen ed., 1885) (emphasis omitted).
91. jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated).
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suggests the sort of knowledge that arises from empirical evidence.
The third entry is: "Art attained by precepts, or built on
principles." 92 The act of building upon principles and precepts
implies the act of reasoning. Thus, Dr. Johnson's second and third
meanings suggest knowledge deriving from experience and reason,
consistent with the Enlightenment. 93
The fourth and fifth entries suggest a classification of knowledge.
The fourth is: "Any art or species of knowledge"; and the fifth: "One
of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, logick, arithmetick,
musick, geometry, astronomy." 94 Both of these entries suggest
classifying knowledge into distinct bodies or groupings. They
suggest an organized system.
Although these five entries portray distinctions in meanings,
they are unified in theme and general meaning. Indeed, Dr. Johnson
noted his intent that each subsequent entry in his Dictionary build
upon the meanings in prior entries. 95 Therefore, the fifth and fourth
entries, which suggest a classification of knowledge, build upon the
third and second, which suggest experience and reason as the means
for gaining knowledge, which builds upon the first, which suggests a
certainty of knowledge. One unifying meaning that encompasses the
primary meanings of all five entries would be the following: certainty
of knowledge, which derives from reason and experience, that yields
an organized grouping of subjects. Of course such an aggregated
definition does not necessarily reflect the specific meaning of Science
in the Copyright Clause. But the aggregation is helpful in
understanding a general meaning that would encompass the themes
of science at the time of the Framing. It represents a data point to
compare against a specific meaning derived from the text of the
Clause.
B. Legislative History

The history of the Copyright Clause began on August 18, 1787,
when two delegates at the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison and Charles Pinckney, each proposed a copyright power. 96

92. Id.
93. See discussion supra Part liLA. I (noting reason and experience as tools of science in
the Enlightenment).
94. jOHNSON, supra note II (unpaginated).
95. See id. at 6 of preface ("[E]very foregoing explanation should tend to that which
follows, and the series be regularly concatenated from the first notion to the last.").
96. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES
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Those proposals were submitted to the Committee on Detail, which
ultimately drafted the final language reflected in the Clause. 97 As
563-64 (Charles Callan Tansill ed., 1927) [hereinafter FORMATION OF THE UNION].
97. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 77, at 473. Backgrounds of several Committee members are
consistent with an interpretation of Science that suggests a scholastic denotation. Of the eleven
members, at least nine had backgrounds suggesting that the group composed the educated elite
of that time.
James Madison was the only Committee member who had proposed a copyright power.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text. For that reason, he might be viewed as the most
influential Committee member regarding the text of the Copyright Clause. But see discussion
infra note 110 (introducing the possibility that Madison may not have been responsible for
inclusion of Science in Copyright Clause). His background that is relevant to copyright and
science I discuss infra in Part lli.B.2, and that discussion suggests he would view science as
connoting a field of study.
Abraham Baldwin came to the Constitutional Convention with experience in copyright,
law, and formal education. As a member of the Georgia legislature, he sponsored Georgia's
copyright statute, which purported to "encourage men of learning and genius to publish their
writings." See COULTER, supra note 81, at 43-44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Baldwin
declined a professorship at Yale University to develop an educational plan for secondary and
higher education in Georgia, which led to the creation of Franklin College, now called the
University of Georgia, of which he was the first president in 1786. Id. at 30, 53-56, 64, 76. His
life devoted to study, Baldwin once noted that "public prosperity and even existence very much
depends upon suitably forming the minds and morals of their Citizens." Id. at 54. An
interpretation of Science as designating scholastic subject matter or fields of study would be
consistent with the life of Abraham Baldwin.
John Dickinson was thought to be one of the most learned men of the Framers. See
MILTON E. FLOWER, jOHN DICKINSON: CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTIONARY 12-19 (1983); M. E.
BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 99 (2d ed. rev. 1994). He warned against persons who would "slight learning."
CHARLES]. STILLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ]OHN DICKINSON, 1732-1808, at 330-31 (1891). He
once wrote: "'Foolish questions,' fables, and endless genealogies, profane and vain babblings,
oppositions of science falsely so called, and winds of doctrine the apostle Paul has justly
condemned, and these, to be sure, should be consigned to perpetual oblivion." Id. Thus,
Dickinson not only appreciated learning, he loathed anything that distracted from it. It is
therefore likely that Dickinson would not have viewed the purpose of copyright as promoting
any sort of knowledge (e.g., fictional fantasy).
Hugh Williamson was a man of science. See BRADFORD, supra, at I 75-76. Prior to the
Constitutional Convention, he had served as a professor of mathematics at the College of
Philadelphia; earned his medical doctor degree; became a member of the American Philosophical
Society (an organization with a purpose to promote useful knowledge in the sciences and
humanities through scholarly research); served on an official commission to observe the paths of
Venus and Mercury; articulated a theory on climate in North America; and participated in
electrical experiments with Benjamin Franklin. Id. If he were to view Science in the Copyright
Clause as a term representative of his own life, it would represent established subjects of study.
Rufus King graduated first in his class at Harvard College-first in mathematics; first in
language; and first in oratory. ROBERT ERNST, RUFUS KING: AMERICAN FEDERALIST 20 n.25
(1968).
Gouverneur Morris attended the Academy of Philadelphia and King's College. MAX M.
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discussed in the two subsections below, their proposals suggest that
Science in the Clause has a meaning that is educationally or
scholastically focused.

1. Pinckney's proposals
Charles Pinckney proposed two congressional powers that were
relevant to copyright. They are the following: first, "To establish
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences";
and second, "To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain
time." 98
Pinckney's first proposal aids in understanding the meaning of
Science in the Copyright Clause. Two observations are noteworthy.
First, Pinckney's proposal is the only one to use the word science (in
the plural form, though). Indeed, the proposal employs three words
(or a form of those words) that appear in the Copyright Clause:
promotion, arts, and sciences. The similarity between the phrase
"promotion of the arts & sciences" in Pinckney's proposal and
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" in the Copyright
Clause is remarkable. 99 The absence of any other proposal using the

MINTZ, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 16 (1970).
David Bready, who was the chair of the Committee on Detail, attended the College of
New Jersey (now Princeton). DONALD SCARINCI, DAVID BREARLEY AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES CoNSTITUTION 44-46 (2005). The full extent of Brearley's studies is a source of
debate.
Roger Sherman was educated in common schools, but was well read in the areas of
theology, history, law, and politics. ROGER SHERMAN BOARDMAN, ROGER SHERMAN SIGNER AND
STATESMAN 15-21 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1938); BRADFORD, supra, at 22.
Daniel Carroll attended the prestigious College of St. Orner in Flanders for six years,
which provided advanced education for English Catholics. MARY VIRGINA GEIGER, DANIEL
CARROLL: A FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1943).
The extent of education of only two Committee members, Pierce Butler and Nicholas
Gilman, is uncertain. Pierce Butler once served as an officer in the British Army and was a man
of great wealth and considerable influence. LEWRIGHT B. SIKES, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PIERCE
BUTLER, SOUTH CAROLINA STATESMAN 2-3 (1979). Nicholas Gilman was educated in public
schools. BRADFORD, supra, at 4. It is thought that Gilman said little, following the lead of those
more decisive around him. Id.
98. FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 96, at 564. Between the two powers listed,
Pinckney also presented two other powers: "To grant charters of incorporation" and "To grant
patents for useful inventions." Id.

99. Similarly, the word "useful" in the Copyright Clause, which modifies the word
describing patents-Arts-appears to originate in Pinckney's third proposal, "useful inventions."
Professor Oliar notes the similarity in verbiage between the Science Clause and Pinckney's
proposal. See Oliar, supra note 45, at 448 n.IOO.
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three words promote, science, or art, coupled with the combination of
the same three words in proximity to one another in both Pinckney's
proposal and the Clause, suggests that the three words in the Clause
share the same meaning as in Pinckney's proposal-and in
particular, the meaning of Science. 100 It therefore appears that the
Committee on Detail adopted science from Pinckney's proposal,
implicitly adopting Pinckney's meaning.
Second, Pinckney's proposal indicates a precise meaning of
science as he employed it. By proposing to establish seminaries for
the promotion of the sciences, Pinckney employs science to
communicate an educational or scholastic denotation. 101
Furthermore, sciences in seminaries represent particular branches of
study. Pinckney's proposal therefore conveys a meaning of sciences
as suggesting the categories of study that are present in a scholastic
context.
2. Madison's proposals

Madison proposed three powers relevant to copyright. They
consist of the following (in the order proposed): first, "To secure to
literary authors their copy rights for a limited time"; second, "To
establish an University"; and third, "To encourage by premiums &
provisiOns, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries." 102
Two observations about these proposals are noteworthy as they
relate to the meaning of Science. First, Madison appears to have
grouped all his proposed powers-not just the ones listed aboveaccording to their similarity in substance. For instance, his first four
proposed powers (not listed above) concern jurisdictions for
territories or sovereignties that were not in the United States. 103 In
100. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1809-10 (observing that Science and Arts in the Intellectual
Property Clause derive from Pinckney's proposal).
101. See id. at 1806-07 (describing Pinckney's proposal as an "education" power).
102. FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 96, at 563.
103. Those first four proposals consisted of the following:
"To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U. States"
"To institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein"
"To regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U.
States"
"To exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the Seat of the General Government,
and over a district around the same, not exceeding ~~ square miles; the Consent
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the three powers listed above, the copyright power immediately
precedes a power related to formal education and another to useful
knowledge. 104 Consistent, then, with Madison's practice of grouping
related powers, the proximity of the copyright power to two powers
that deal with education and useful knowledge suggests the
copyright power's general scope and purpose-a context of
educational learning.
Second, Madison never used the word science in his
proposals. 105 The meaning of Science cannot be directly linked to
any of the proposals that Madison set forth. Instead, the suggestion
of educational learning that the three proposals generally suggest
may only indirectly speak to the meaning of Science in the Clause.
That Madison did not use the word science in his proposal,
however, should not be understood to mean that his usage pattern of
that word was not relevant to its appearance in the Copyright
Clause. Madison was a member of the ten-member Committee on
Detail that drafted the Copyright Clause. 106 And he was the only
member of the Committee who had proposed a copyright power
(Charles Pinckney was not a Committee member) . 107 Also, prior to
the Constitutional Convention, Madison had served as one of three
Virginian legislators who prepared the Virginia copyright statute,
and he had served on a three-member Continental Congress
committee that had drafted a resolution recommending individual
states enact copyright statutes. 108 After the convention, he is the
only Framer to have discussed the copyright power in defending the
Constitution. 109

of the Legislature of the State or States com prizing the same, being first obtained."
Id. at 563.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. 2 RECORDS, supra note 77, at 473.
107. Seeid.
108. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, jOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1781-86), S.
October 17, 1785-january 21, 1786, at 39, 40 (Richmond, 1828); see also BRUCE W. BUGBEE,
GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 121 (1967). Interestingly, neither of these
pieces of legislation referred to science or any other reason-instrumental or otherwise-for
copyright.
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 Qames Madison) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Not long
after the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney did publish a pamphlet entitled,
"Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention in
Philadelphia," which referenced the copyright power. See 3 RECORDS, supra note 77, at 106.
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These historical evidences suggest that Madison may have held a
keen interest in the drafting of the Copyright Clause. Moreover, with
his interest in copyright ostensibly well known by other Committee
members, his views on the Copyright Clause likely would have
carried great weight. 110 Therefore, examining Madison's use of the
word science in other works may further illuminate the meaning of
Science in the Clause. That examination follows in the paragraph
below.
Madison's use of the term science in writings prior to the
Constitutional Convention suggests a specific meaning. My research
revealed seven writings prior to the Convention where Madison
employed science or sciences. The context of all seven writings indicate
that Madison employed science to mean a branch of study or category
of specialized knowledge as opposed to mere general knowledge
(e.g., "the Science of Morals"; "the most sublime of all Sciences";
"the science of commerce"). 111 Madison's use of science after the
110. Although Madison's view on the meaning of science is certainly worthy of
consideration, it may not be the dispositive authority on the meaning of Science in the Copyright
Clause. Tellingly, neither the copyright power that Madison proposed at the Convention, the
Virginia copyright statute that he prepared, nor the Continental Congress copyright resolution
that he helped draft-mention science. See sources cited supra notes 106, 108. Indeed, an
instrumental reason for copyright protection appears in neither his copyright-power proposal,
the Virginia copyright statute, nor the Continental Congress resolution. See supra notes 102, 106,
108. Madison apparently did not think it necessary to mention any reason for copyright -science
or otherwise. Thus, the inclusion of Science in the Copyright Clause may not have reflected
Madison's opinion. There is thus reason to think that others on the Committee may have been
responsible for Science appearing in the Clause. Hence, the backgrounds of other Committee
members should also be examined for further indications of Science's meaning. See supra text
accompanying note 97.
111. Further excerpts of the seven instances are as follows:
In 1772, Madison wrote: "I think you made a judicious choice of History and the science of
morals for your winter's study." Letter from james Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 9, 1772),
in 1 THE WR!TlNGS OF ]AMES MADISON 11 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900) (hereinafter MADISON
WRITINGS] (emphasis added).
In 1773, Madison wrote: "[K]eep the Ministry obliquely in View whatever your profession
be. This will lead you to cultivate an acquaintace [sic] occasionally with the most sublime of all
Sciences . . . . "Letter from james Madison to William Bradford (Sept. 25, 1773), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF jAMES MADISON 96 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1962)
[hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (emphasis added).
In 1773, Madison wrote: "I intend myself to read Law occasionally and have procured
books for that purpose so that you need not fear offending me by Allusions to that science."
Letter from james Madison to William Bradford (Dec. 1, 1773), in 1 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at
100-101 (emphasis added).
In 1779, Madison wrote: "From a new arrangement of the college here nothing is in
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Constitutional Convention suggests the same meaning: of sixteen
instances after the Convention, fourteen clearly indicate a particular
branch of study (e.g., "political science"; "science of government";
"mathematical science"; "law as a science"); 112 the other two

future to be taught but the higher & rarer branches of Science." Letter from James Madison to
James Madison, Sr. (Dec. 8, 1779), in 1 MADISON WRITINGS, supra, at 56 (emphasis added).
In 1783, Madison wrote: "That of G. B. [Great Britain] is in the science of commerce
particularly worthy of our attention . . . . " Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph
(May 20, 1783), in 1 MADISON WRITINGS, supra, at 467 (emphasis added).
In 1783, Madison wrote: "But his wish is to be introduced in the first instance into a
Gentleman's family where he may at the same time be employ'd in teaching the Languages &
some of the more useful branches of science . . . . " Letter from James Madison to the Reverend
James Madison. (Oct. 2, 1783), in 7 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 365 (emphasis added).
In 1783, Madison wrote in a Virginia Committee Report: "[W]ar is become a
Science . . . . "Report from James Madison to Congress (Sept. 19, 1783), in 7 MADISON PAPERS,
supra, at 348.
112. The fourteen instances are as follows:
(I) "[B]y dividing & subdividing the branches of Science now in the same group." Letter from
James Madison to Frederick Beasley (Dec. 22, 1824), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at
212.
(2) "This has always been regarded by us as claiming an important place in so comprehensive a
School of Science." I d.
(3) "Much may be expected from the progress and diffusion of political science in dissipating
errors . . . ." Letter from James Madison to Unknown (Mat. 1836), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS,
supra note 111, at 610.
(4) "[A]nd to all who take an interest in the progress of political science and the cause of true
liberty." James Madison's Will (Apr. 19, 1835), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note I 1 I. at 549.
(S) "Our history, short as it is, has already disclosed great errors sanctioned by great names, in
political science . . . . " Letter from James Madison to Daniel Drake Oan. 12, 1835), in 9
MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 546.
(6) "[T]he system forming an innovation and an epoch in the science of Government no less
honorable to the people to whom it owed its birth . . . . " Letter from James Madison to
Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 430 n.6.
(7) "To appreciate your proposed expedient for a standard of measures & weights would require
more time than I can apply, & more mathematical Science than I retain." Letter from James
Madison to A. B. Woodward (Sept. 11, 1824), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 207.
(8) "I know not a better service, that could be rendered to the science of political
economy . . . . "Letter from James Madison to Thomas Cooper (Mar. 23, 1824), in 9 MADISON
WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 179.
(9) "[T]hat the progress of political Science, and the lessons of experience will not be lost on the
National Council." Id. at 181.
(10) "Throughout the Civilized World, nations are courting the praise of fostering Science and
the useful Arts, and are opening their eyes to the principles and the blessings of Representative
Government." Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 MADISON
WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 107.
(II) "[T]here are some considerations to be taken into the account which have been little
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instances are not as clear, but are at least consistent with the
particular-branch-of-study meaning. 113 Madison therefore appears to
have consistently employed science in a manner suggesting particular
branches of study.
Of course Madison's usage pattern of the word science does not
directly speak to its meaning in the Clause. Yet it can at least be said
that Madison's usage pattern would be consistent with an
interpretation of Science in the Clause that suggests branches of
study. And given Madison's history surrounding both copyright law
generally and its implementation into the Constitution, consistency
between Madison's usage pattern and the interpretation of the
Clause becomes a relevant consideration.
C. Textual Analysis

In addition to historical evidence from the convention, the text of
the Copyright Clause indicates a precise meaning of Science: a
system of knowledge comprising, or derived from, distinct branches
of study. This conclusion stems from two textual indicators: first,

Adverted to by the most oracular Authors on the Science of Govt . . . . " Letter from james
Madison to john G. jackson (Dec. 27, 1821), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 76.
(12) "&as a source perhaps of some lights on the Science of Govt. the legitimate meaning of the
Instrument must be derived from the text itself . . . . " Id. at 72 n.l.
(13) "It is not only desirable therefore that the national code should receive whatever
improvements the cultivation of law as a science may impart but that the local codes should be
improved in like manner . . . . " Letter from james Madison to Peter S. Du Ponceau (May
1821), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 63.
(14) "But a Central Institution is just now on foot in the State of Virginia, which in its
development will embrace an extensive circle of sciences . . . . " Letter from james Madison to
Charles Keilsall (Oct. 1817), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF jAMES MADISON 49
B.
Lippincott & Co. 1867).
Further instances of Madison's use of science may arise in a report he assisted in drafting
for the Virginia General Assembly in 1818. See Report of the Board of Commissioners for the
University of Virginia to the Virginia General Assembly (Aug. 4, 1818), in THE PAPERS OF ]AMES
MADISON 326-39
.C.A. Stagg ed.) available at http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders
/default.xqy?keys=JSMN-print&mode=TOC. Those instances, however, cannot be ascribed to
Madison personally, however, because 20 other committee members share responsibility for the
report. See id. at 338-39.
113. The two other instances do not indicate a meaning contrary to branch of knowledge
(i.e., referring to the University of Virginia as "a temple dedicated to science"; referring to
Thomas Jefferson as a "luminary of Science"). See Letter from james Madison to Samuel Harrison
Smith (Nov. 4, 1826), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 258; Letter from james
Madison to N.P. Trist Quly 6, 1826), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 248.

a.

a
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the juxtaposition of Science and useful Arts; and second, the
inconsistency between the singular form of Science and the plural
form of Arts. Together, these two textual evidences indicate a precise
meaning.

1. The juxtaposition of Science and Arts
That the Copyright Clause conjoins Science with useful Arts
implies meaning. On this point, the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) is instructive.ll 4 Like johnson's Dictionary, the OED does
not order its entries for words according to most common usage. 115
Rather, it orders them according to chronological etymologyY 6
The OED indicates that its third entry for science was in use
during the time of the Framing. 117 That entry states: "(a) A
particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of
learning. (b) Contradistinguished from art." 118 Subdefinition (b)
indicates that where science is contrasted with art, science means a
particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of
learning.
Such a contrast between science and arts appears in the Copyright
Clause, implying that Science refers to the third entry definition in
the OED-a particular branch of knowledge or study. The contrast is
apparent from the adjective useful that precedes only Arts. The word
useful is important in the Clause because, as a general matter, arts
could be interpreted two different ways alongside science. On the
one hand, arts could mean branches of study-as in the seven liberal
arts 119 -which use of arts was common at the Framing. 120 On the

114. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 648-49 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter OED).
115. DONNA LEE BERG, A GUIDE TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 28 (1993).
116. Id.
117. 14 OED, supra note 114, at 648-49.
118. Jd. The third entry lists two more meanings, neither of which seem relevant in the
Copyright Clause: "c. the noble science (of defence): the art of boxing or that of fencing" and
"d. A craft, trade, or occupation requiring trained skill. Obsolete." Id. Subdefinition (c) would
not apply to the extent that the Copyright Clause does not suggest a meaning of boxing or
fencing (although those arts would have required knowledge and skill). Subdefinition (d) also
does not apply given that it is obsolete, the last use noted in 1660.
119. The OED explains: "In the Middle Ages, 'the seven (liberal) sciences' was often
used synonymously with 'the seven liberal arts', for the group of studies comprised by the
Trivium (Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric) and the Quadrivium (Arithmetic, Music, Geometry,
Astronomy)." 14 OED, supra note 114, at 648.
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other hand, arts could mean practical applications of knowledge 121 as in the art practiced by an artisan or craftsman. Hence, two
meanings of arts were possible, and the Framers provided a clear
indication of which meaning they intended. They employed useful
next to Arts to convey the meaning of practical applications of
knowledge. As practical applications of knowledge, useful Arts
contrasts with the source of the theoretical knowledge that underlies
it, i.e., Science. 122 In short, the Copyright Clause contrasts Science
with useful Arts. Accordingly, Science takes on the third entry in the
OED-a particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized
department of learning. 123
The contrast between Science and Arts is further apparent in the
balance and parallelism of the Copyright (and Patent) ClauseScience, Authors, and Writings each precedes useful Arts, Inventors, and
Discoveries, respectively. 124 The first group corresponds to copyright
and the second to patent, ultimately suggesting a distinction in
meaning between Science and useful Arts, the former representing
copyright and the latter patent. 125 That distinction in meaning
suggests a contrast between Science and Arts in the Clause. As the
OED indicates, such a contrast implies that Science means a
particular branch of knowledge or study.
Lexicography sources at the Framing are consistent with
interpreting Science as a particular branch of knowledge or study. As
discussed above, Dr. Johnson's Dictionary is perhaps the most

120. For instance, four state copyright statutes that were enacted prior to the
Constitutional Convention employed the term science, and did so in the phrase "arts and
sciences" without employing useful next to either arts or sciences. See Copyright Acts of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS,
supra note 81, at 4, 8, 9, II. Ostensibly, the use of arts here served as a synonym with sciences,
i.e., suggesting the liberal arts as the categories of scientific studies.
121. The OED defines the meaning of art that contrasts with science as a practical
application of any science. See 14 OED, supra note 114, at 649.
122. See id. ("The distinction [between science and art] as commonly apprehended is that a
science is concerned with theoretic truth, and an art with methods for effecting certain
results.").
123. See id.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ").
125. See sources cited supra note 53; cf. RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT
LAW 15 (1925) (introducing balanced nature of Copyright and Patent Clause).
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authoritative source of that time. The fourth definition for science
states: a "species of knowledge." 126 The fifth definition states: "One
of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetoric, logick, arithmetic,
musick, geometry, astronomy." 127 Dr. Johnson's conception of
science as species of knowledge and as particular subject areas of
study is consistent with Science as branches of knowledge or study.
Noah Webster's definition of science is also instructive. 128
Webster explained science as the collection of general principles or
truths in a particular subject matter. 129 Science, according to
Webster, represents the abstract principles in a particular subject
that controls the practical application of knowledge in the art. 13 In
his first dictionary, published in 1828, Webster stated: "In general,
an art is that which depends on practice or performance, and science
that which depends on abstract or speculative principles. The theory
of music is a science; the practice of it an art." 131 Hence, Webster
recognized the contrast between art and science, and he treated
science as the particular focus of study. 132

126. jOHNSON, supra note 11. See also THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. Philadelphia 1796) (unpaginated) (defining science as
"Knowledge . . . any species of knowledge").
127. jOHNSON, supra note 11.
128. See NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York,
S. Converse 1828) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S 1828 DICTIONARY] (unpaginated). In addition to his
1828 dictionary being the first dictionary published in the United States, Webster was an
influential advocate for copyright at the time of the Framing. See WARFEL, supra note 81, at 5359. Webster would have been well familiar with the focus on science and arts in the
Constitution. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xviii.
129. Webster described science as follows:
In philosophy, a collection of the general principles or leading truths relating to any
subject. Pure science, as the mathematics, is built on self-evident truths; but the term
science is also applied to other subjects founded on generally acknowledged truths, as
metaphysics; or on experiment and observation, as chimistry [sic] and natural philosophy;
or even to an assemblage of the general principles of an art, as the science or
agriculture; the science of navigation. Arts relate to practice, as painting and sculpture.
WEBSTER'S 1828 DICTIONARY (unpaginated).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See id. The same meaning appears in the 1752 edition of Ephraim Chambers's
Cyclopaedia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, which meaning Professor Bernard Cohen
associated with Science in the Copyright Clause. See EPHRAIM CHAMBERS, CYCLOPAOD!A, OR, AN
UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 32 (London 1728); COHEN supra note 44, at 30608. Chambers noted that when science is used in opposition to art, it "is particularly used for a
form'd System of any Branch of Knowledge; comprehending the Doctrine, Reason and Theory, of
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Interpreting Science as branch of study rather than mere general
knowledge is consistent with writings of then-influential thinkers. 133
In addition to the writings of James Madison that I discuss above, I
give a few examples here. 134 In a letter to his wife, John Adams
wrote: "The science of government it is my duty to study, more than
all other sciences; the arts of legislation and administration and
negotiation ought to take place of, indeed to exclude, in a manner,
all other arts." 135 Here, government is the abstract branch of study,
the science. The applications of that science are the practical
activities of government, i.e., the arts of legislation, administration,
and negotiation.
Alexander Hamilton referred to the "sciences of morals and
politics." 136 Ben Franklin wrote: "Will not the Knowledge of the
Mathematicks, Astronomy, and Natural Philosophy, those sublime
Sciences, give a Right to the Character of a Man of Sense?" 137 Thomas
Jefferson wrote of "government, religion, morality and every other
science." 138
In sum, the contrast of Science and Arts in the Clause indicates
that Science has a meaning that indicates a branch of study or
category of knowledge. This meaning is consistent with dictionaries
of the time and the writings of influential thinkers.
2. The singular-plural inconsistency between Science and Arts
The singular form of Science in the Copyright Clause suggests
meaning. In the singular form, science as meaning branch of study
usually signifies only one particular branch. Yet although the

the Thing, without any immediate Application thereof to any Uses or Offices of life." CHAMBERS,

supra, at 32. Hence, Chambers observed that science, when contrasted with art, suggests a
theoretic branch of knowledge.
133. These examples do not represent a comprehensive account of each writer's use of the
word. The examples demonstrate only that Science as meaning particular branches of study
would not have been foreign in the writings of influential thinkers of the time.
134. See discussion supra Part Ill.B.2.
135. Letter from john Adams to Abigail Adams (without date, 1780), in FAMILIAR LETTERS
OF jOHN ADAMS AND HIS WIFE ABIGAIL ADAMS, DURING THE REVOLUTION 381 (Charles Francis
Adams ed. 1875) [hereinafter FAMILIAR LETTERS] (emphasis added).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
137. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, A MAN OF SENSE (1735), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKI.IN 16 (Leonard W. Labaree ed. 1960) (emphasis added).
138. Seidel, supra note 11, at 12 n.15.
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Copyright Clause employs Science in the singular, presumably the
Clause does not signify only one particular branch. So if Science
represents branches of study, why isn't it in the plural?
This question becomes more pressing given that the Committee
on Detail likely deliberately chose to place Science in the singular
rather than the plural. As an initial matter, to the extent that the
Committee was familiar with the state copyright statutes, it is
relevant that the state copyright statutes that employed the term
science (four in total) did so in the plural, referring to "the arts and
sciences." 139 Furthermore, recall that the only reference to science in
the proposals under consideration was Pinckney's proposal, and that
proposal referred to the plural form-i.e., sciences. 140 Recall also
that the Copyright Clause reflects great attention to stylistic
consistency; however, Science in the singular form creates a glaring
stylistic inconsistency as it appears next to the plural Arts. 141 The
inconsistency becomes more apparent when considering the fact that
other than Science, all nouns in the Clause unique to either the
copyright or patent powers are in the plura1. 142 Thus, the departure
from the plural form in the state copyright statutes, the departure
from the plural form in Pinckney's proposal, and the blatant stylistic
inconsistency of the singular form all indicate a deliberate choice to
make Science singular. Why?
By placing Science in the singular, the Committee on Detail
apparently intended a meaning distinct from the plural sciences. That
meaning consists of an abstraction from the particular sciences, i.e., the
systemic whole of individual sciences. In the plural, sciences represents
the particular subjects of study, whereas science represents the system
comprising the particular subjects of study. The singular captures the
collective whole as opposed to the collection of individual parts.

139. See supra note 120.
140. See discussion supra Part III.B; FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 96, at 564.
141. The words in the Clause relating to copyright precede the words relating to patent
(Science, Authors, and Writings respectively precede useful Arts, Inventors, and Discoveries).
See supra note 53.
142. See U.S. CoN ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."). Although "right" is in the singular, it is not specific to either the
copyright or patent powers.
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Such a connotation is apparent in an analogous context-the
word, law. In the singular, law may represent the collective whole of
all possible laws; it is a general abstraction of all the particular
laws. 143 When we say "law restrains conduct," we speak of law as a
general concept encompassing the system of all particular laws. By
contrast, in the plural, the word laws represents particular laws.
When we say "laws restrain conduct," we speak of laws as the actual,
individual laws. Hence, there are two ways to express the entirety of
a set of subjects-the singular abstraction (e.g., law or science) and
the plural particulars (e.g., laws or sciences).
These two ways of expressing the collection of subjects admit a
distinction in meaning. The meaning of the singular abstraction
includes the collective whole of the particulars, but the meaning of
the plural particulars does not. That is, a representation of the
collective whole suggests more than its individual parts. The sum is
greater than its parts. Law suggests more than laws. Science suggests
more than sciences. Science as a representation of the collective whole
of all specific branches of study captures a system that derives from
all those specific branches. Whereas sciences in the plural represents
only the individual sciences operating independently of the others,
science in the singular represents the entire system of all possible
particular sciences functioning together as one. Stated another way,
science in the singular form represents the system of knowledge from
which all the particular branches derive.
The Committee on Detail thus appears to have placed Science in
the singular form to capture the abstract meaning of all branches of
science, or in other words, the system from which the particulars
derive. 144 This interpretation of Science in the singular is supported

143. See THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 619 (Stephen Michael Sheppard
ed., 2011).
144. This reason for placing Science in the singular further explains why the Committee
kept arts in the plural, purposefully creating an inconsistency between Science and Arts. As
discussed above, useful Arts means the practical applications that derive from the theoretic truth
contained in the sciences. See 14 OED, supra note 114, at 649. Abstracting from the specific
practical applications of the useful Arts implies the sciences that underlie those arts. Science
captures the abstractions of the applications, arts. Accordingly, there is nothing to abstract from
the specific applications of useful Arts that would not be captured within the abstract term of
Science. It would make no sense to place useful Arts in the singular form as representing an
abstraction of those Arts, for the abstraction is contained in Science. The Committee apparently
intended that the meaning of all the individual applications of Science-i.e., the useful Artsimply nothing more than all those individual applications.
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by a writing of one of the members of the Committee on Detail,
Hugh Williamson. Williamson wrote:
[T]he Grecians . . . exceeded all other nations in arts and
learning. The Grecians, or rather the Athenians, were not indebted
to soil or climate for the extraordinary progress they made in science
and the liberal arts; thel were merely indebted to the high degree of
liberty they enjoyed. 14

Here, Williamson appears to employ both science and liberal arts
as words meaning a group of theoretical studies. Both are collective
nouns. 146 Yet science is in the singular and liberal arts is in the plural,
suggesting that science represents the system of the grouping of
studies, whereas liberal arts represents the seven specific groupings
that then comprised all possible liberal arts (grammar, rhetoric,
logic, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) . 147
An implication of construing Science to mean a system that
derives from a collective whole is that Science would include
branches not yet in existence-i.e., evolving branches. The system as
a whole contemplates additions and changes to the component parts.
It is broader than its individual pieces. Science, then, would not be
limited to only the branches of study that existed at the Framing; it
would contemplate growing and evolving categories.
Support for this interpretation arises in the writing of John
Adams. Adams alluded to this principle of evolving branches of
knowledge in a letter to Abigail Adams in 1800, while President of
the United States. 148 He wrote: "I must study politics and war, that
my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and
philosophy . . . geography, natural history and naval architecture,
navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order to give their children
a right to study paintin~, poetry, music, architecture, statuary,
tapestry, and porcelain." 1 9 Adams thus spoke of a potential for

145. Hugh Williamson, A Discourse on the Benefits of Civil History, delivered before the New-York
Historical Society (Dec 6, 1810), in 2 COLLECTIONS OF THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, FOR THE
YEAR 1814,30-31 (New York, Van Winkle & Wiley 1814) (emphasis added).
146. See id.
147. Compare id. with]OHNSON, supra note 11 (listing the seven liberal arts as the fifth entry
for science).
148. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (without date, 1780), in FAMILIAR LETTERS,
supra note 135 (emphasis added).
149. ld.
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expanding fields of study. 150 He recognized that the result of refining
existent branches of study is the creation of more branches. 151 And
that idea appears to be present in the singular form of Science. 152
Thus, the Framers appear to have intended Science in the
Copyright Clause to represent a system of knowledge comprising
distinct branches of study. As discussed in the immediate preceding
subsection, Science's meaning as distinct categories of knowledge or
branches of study is apparent from the juxtaposition of Science and
useful Arts. 153 As discussed in this subsection, Science's meaning as
a system is apparent from its singular form that represents an
abstraction of the entire set of branches of knowledge. 154 Science in
the Copyright Clause therefore represents a system of knowledge
comprising, or derived from, distinct branches of study.

D. Post-Constitution Evidence
Treatment of copyright law following the Constitutional
Convention further suggests this meaning of Science. Distinct pieces
of evidence during this time period suggest the understanding of the
general public, a member of the Supreme Court, and Congress. 155
This Section discusses that evidence.

1. The public understanding
Perhaps the most valuable evidence regarding the original
meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause consists of that which
suggests the public's understanding. The prevailing approach to an
original textual analysis of the Constitution examines the meanings
of words from the perspective of the political and linguistic
community that adopted them as law. 156 Under this approach, a
word's public meaning at the time of the Framing is the most

150. See id.
151. See id.
152. This characteristic of evolving branches of study in the system of Science suggests
that the system contemplates mere attempts at establishing a branch of knowledge, even if those
attempts are unsuccessful.
153. See discussion supra Part Ill. C. I.
154. See discussion supra Part lii.C.2.
155. See discussion infra Part Ili.D.l-3.
156. See generally sources cited supra note 68.
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persuasive evidence of its meaning in the Constitution. 157 Hence,
evidence of the public's understanding of either science generally, or
more relevantly, Science in the Copyright Clause, is valuable in
arriving at an originalist understanding of Science.
One key piece of evidence surrounding the public's
understanding of Science in the Clause consists in the sort of
material that the public initially registered for copyright protection
following the Constitutional Convention. 158 In the decade following
ratification of the Constitution, federal courts kept records of the
sorts of works that the public registered for copyright protection. 159
Of course these registered works do not conclusively prove any
meaning of Science; they support a meaning only to the extent
registrants believed that their works would promote the Progress of
Science. This assumption cannot be definitively established.
Nevertheless, the sorts of works do share commonality, and that fact
supports an inference regarding the public understanding of Science.

157. See Konig, supra note 68, at 1301-07 (describing his interpretive textual analysis as
original public meaning rather than original intent of the Framers); Sacharoff, supra note 68, at
323 n.143 (explaining distinction between original intent and original public meaning).
158. Dictionaries of the time would of course inform the public understanding of Science
at the Framing. Yet as discussed above, dictionaries of the time-like Dr. johnson's Dictionarydid not arrange meanings by public usage patterns. See discussion supra Part 1l.B.l. Nor did they
specify whether the entries retlected actual usage as opposed to purported proper usage. Their
value is therefore limited in determining the most common public understanding of Science.
Dictionaries, however, do not represent the only means for tracking public usage patterns
of words. The field of corpus linguistics offers resources to word usage patterns in the past two
centuries. Corpus linguistics is a methodology that analyzes the use of language through various
sources compiled in an electronic database called a corpus. See Mouritsen, supra note 39, at 1954.
The Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) represents the largest freely-available
corpus of the English language. See CORPUS OF HIST. AM. ENG. (COHA),
http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). It processes data that is available on
Coogle Books, although its resources do not extend back to the decade of the Framing. See id.
When searching for the use of science during the 181 Os and 1820s, COHA reveals that
the most commonly used three-word phrase (in Coogle Books) that includes the word science is
the phrase, "the science of." See id. No other three-word phrase was even half as commonly used.
See id. This data indicates that a few decades after the Framing, "the science of" was a common
phrase. And the phrase "the science of' indicates that the next word or phrase will represent a
particular field of study. Therefore, the prevalence of "the science of' suggests that a common
public understanding of science related to particular fields of study. COHA supports the
conclusion that a few the decades after the Constitutional Convention, science was commonly
found in a phrase indicating field of study. See id.
159. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xxii.
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Before examining those works, it is important to note that the
registration process under the 1790 Act did not involve any
governmental entity endorsin~ the registration. 160 Unlike the
registration process of today, 1 1 under the 1790 Act an author
merely filed a record at a local federal district court without any
governmental endorsement of the registration. 162 The subjects of
registration were not screened for content-although their content
could be challenged after registration. 163 Thus, coupled with this
background, the types of works registered at the time suggest, but
do not establish, a public understanding of the sorts of works that
copyright would protect.
Copyright registration records are available for the decade
between 1790 and 1800. 164 Two scholars, James Gilreath and
Elizabeth Carter Wills, performed a detailed examination of federal
copyright records from that period. Gilreath observed a great
imbalance in the types of works registered. 165 Regarding "serious
imaginative works," Gilreath noted that only a handful were
registered. 166
By contrast, practical or commercially useful books constituted a
majority of those registered. 167 Textbooks, manuals, geographical
atlases, and commercial directories were common. 168 Interestingly,
although such practical works constituted a high proportion of
registered material, they did not reflect the same proportion of
printed work of the time. 169 Imaginative works were noticeably
underrepresented in the federal registration records. 170 On the other
hand, imaginative works were well represented in state registration
records. 171 These observations suggest an understanding that federal
160. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (1790).
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006).
162. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xxii.
163. See, e.g., Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872)
(challenging copyright based on content of material).
164. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xxii.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. ("[A] larger proportion of state copyright registrations than federal
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copyright of that time did not extend to any subject matter, but
rather only those subjects which were instructional or associated
with specific branches of study.
2. A Supreme Court justice

During the contemporary period of the Framers, there is no
record of any judicial opinion that examines the meaning of Science
in the Copyright Clause. There is, however, such an opinion that was
written in 1829 soon after most of the Framers had died. 172 The
1829 case, Clayton v. Stone, was written by Supreme Court Justice
Smith Thompson, who was a young contemporary of the
Framers. 173Justice Thompson sat by designation as a Circuit Justice
for the federal court in the Southern District of New York, hearing
the Clayton case. 174 Clayton raised the issue of whether a pricecurrent-a weekly publication of market prices-was copyrightable
in view of the restricting term, Science, in the Copyright Clause. 175
Justice Thompson denied protection for the price-current on the
grounds that it did not satisfy the meaning of Science. 176 He
explained that because Congress passed the 1790 Copyright Act in
execution of its power under the Copyright Clause, that Act's object
was necessarily to promote Science and that the price-current did not
do so. 177 In his words:
[I]t would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of the sciences to
consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as

registrations were for imaginative works.").
172. See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872).
173. See id. at 1000. See also Gerald T. Dunne, Smith Thompson, in 1 THE jUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 475 (Leon
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
174. See Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 999.
175. Id. at 1003.
176. !d. Setting aside the question of whether the price-current complies with the original
meaning of Science, it may or may not have been deemed to constitute copyrightable subject
matter under modern copyright jurisprudence. On the one hand, the market prices would seem
to reflect facts that are not copyrightable under Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 344-45 (1991). On the other hand, catalogues that have estimated prices have been viewed
as statements of opinion, rather than fact, and therefore copyrightable. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc.
v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1994).
177. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003. Justice Thompson impliedly distinguished useful Arts from
Science here. See id.
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falling within any class of them. They are of a more fixed,
permanent and durable character. The term science cannot, with any
propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating and fugitive a form
as that of a newspaper or price current, the subject-matter of which
is daily changing, and is of mere temporary use. 178

Justice Thompson thus considered Science to reflect subjects that
were "fixed, permanent and durable." 179 He expressly opined that
Science could not apply to works that were "fluctuating and
fugitive," "daily changing," or of "mere temporary use." 180 His
interpretation of Science suggests an established field of study,
precluding Science as general knowledge. 181
Also notable about Justice Thompson's opinion is that he
recognized that public utility of a price-current, as well as the
diligent labor that it took to produce it, does not give rise to
copyright ~rotection absent a connection with "learning and the
sciences." 1 2 Science as a fixed, permanent, and durable subject is
necessary for protection regardless of whether the expression is
valuable according to some other means of measurement, so taught
Justice Thompson. 183 Thus, the respected judicial contemporary of
the Framers, Justice Smith Thompson, understood Science as
requiring works to have a purpose that served an established branch
of study. 184

178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id.
180. Jd.
181. See id.
182. In justice Thompson's words:
Although great praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in
publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this
way; it must seek patronage and protection from its utility to the public and not as a
work of science. The title of the act of congress is ("]for the encouragement of
learning,["] and was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry,
unconnected with learning and the sciences.
Jd. (citation omitted).
183. See id.
184. See id.
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3. The 1790 Congress

Congress enacted the first federal copyright statute in 1790. 185
That 1790 Act might be interpreted as indicating an original
understanding of the Copyright Clause given the Act's close
proximity to the ratification of the Constitution. 186 And although
the Act does not specifically define Science, it provides evidence of
its meanin~ in its stated purpose: "the Encouragement of
Learning." 18 Important here is the meaning of Learning. Learning did
not mean the acquisition of any information at all. Rather, learning
suggested the acquisition of information related to either scholastic
knowledge or some sort of skill. 188 Dr. Johnson's Dictionary defines
learning as:
Literature; skill in languages or sciences; generally
Scholastick knowledge.
Skill in any thing good or bad. 189

The first definition suggests either a skill or scholastic
knowledge. 190 Likewise, the second definition implies some sort of a
skill. Skill suggests an aptitude or ability; 191 scholastic knowledge
suggests an acquisition of educational information. 192 Both imply

185. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
186. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) ("The
construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and the act of 1802, by the
men who were contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of the
convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight . . . . ").
187. The full title of the 1790 Copyright Act reads: "An Act for the encouragement of
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. IS, 1 Stat. 124. See
1790 Federal Copyright Act in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 81, at 22.
188. See jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated).
189. Id.
190. johnson defines literature as "learning; skill in letters." !d.
191. See 15 OED, supra note 114, at 603 (defining skill as, inter alia, "[c]apability of
accomplishing something with precision and certainty; practical knowledge in combination with
ability; clerverness, exepertness . . . . [A]n ability to perform a function, acquired or learnt with
practice").
192. See 14 OED, supra note 114, at 630 (defining scholastic as, inter alia, "studious,
learned;" "[h]aving the characteristics of the scholar or student, as distinguished from the man
of affairs"); 8 OED, supra note 114, at 517 (defining knowledge as, inter alia, "[a]cquaintance
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meanings narrower than mere acquisition of any sort of information.
Hence, the title of the 1790 Copyright Act, "An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning," suggests the purpose of copyright as
encouraging skills or scholastic knowledge. It does not suggest a
purpose of encouraging the production of any and all information.
IV. THE MEANING OF SCIENCE RESTORED

As discussed above, Science in the Copyright Clause did not
mean general knowledge of anything. 193 The modern interpretation
of the original meaning is simply incorrect. Science connoted a
system of knowledge that derives from branches of study. 194 It
represented subjects that were worthy of study. At first glance, this
more accurate understanding of Science might suggest that the scope
of copyright law should be limited to educational material. If Science
limits the scope of copyright to material that relates to subjects of
study, it could be argued that copyright should be limited to material
with a scholastic purpose. That interpretation, however, I do not
propose. I propose that Science should preclude only expression that
would fail to receive protection under the Free Speech Clause. That
proposal and potential objections are discussed below.
A. An Interpretation that Excludes Unprotected Speech

As a system of knowledge, Science in the Copyright Clause
encompassed a broad array of subjects in a vast range of settings. 195
Science was growing and expanding, ever changing both in subject
matter and means of study. 196 That flexibility should control its
application today. Science should recognize the explosion of fields
that society now considers worthy of study. It should extend beyond
the formal classroom, contemplating studies of culture, customs, and
opinion. For instance, much of today's entertainment may be seen as
providing valuable insight about human behavior. Hence, my
proposal for applying a more accurate meaning of Science would

with a branch of learning, a language, or the like; theoretical or practical understanding of an art,
science, industry, etc.").
193. See discussion supra Part III.
194. See discussion supra Part III.
195. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
196. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
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preserve copyright protection for most expression that now enjoys
that protection. Most expression may be viewed as an illustration of
that which merits study. Flexible application of the original meaning
of Science to modern culture suggests that copyright should
encompass a broad array of expression.
This conclusion immediately raises the question of whether the
more accurate interpretation of Science discussed in this Article
would change anything in copyright law. Other than an academic
exercise in history, would a more accurate understanding of the
original meaning of Science affect the scope of copyright protection?
What difference would it make? The answer to this question is that
the more accurate understanding of Science should discriminate
against at least a small group of expression that presently does
receive copyright protection. Although most expression should fit
comfortably within a flexible interpretation of the original meaning
of Science, this should not hold for all expression. No matter how
flexible Science might be construed, if Science represents a system of
knowledge that derives from branches of study, Science should
discriminate against that which, by definition, is not a part of-and
indeed may be harmful to-that system. I propose that one distinct
group of expression should categorically fall outside the meaning of
Science-namely, expression that fails to receive protection under
the Free Speech Clause. 197
By definition, unprotected speech under the Free Speech Clause
lacks sufficient social value to protect it from censorship. 198
Censorship is condoned because value is absent. And that absence of
value under free speech doctrine implies the absence of value in the
system of knowledge that comprises branches of study, i.e., Science.
Expression that lacks value sufficient to receive protection as speech

197. In another work, I contemplate whether Science (or the Progress Clause) should
discriminate against one other category of works-those which are harmful to society yet
protected by the Free Speech Clause. See Snow, supra note 42.
198. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements
of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas . . . . ");Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity
as expression that "lacks serious literary, artistic, political. or scientific value"); Chaplinsky v.
State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (recognizing that unprotected
expressions "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality").
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necessarily fails to augment a branch of study that would further
Science's system of knowledge. Moreover, much unprotected speech
results in various harms to society, and those harms arguably detract
from Science's system of knowledge-the sort of system that is
worthy of study and promotion. 199 Therefore, content that lacks
value as protectable speech, and indeed often causes harm to society,
must lack value as promotable Science. I thus propose that courts
should preclude copyright protection of unprotected speech under
the more accurate meaning of Science.
By withholding the monopoly of copyright from obscenity, libel,
and expression that incites imminent lawless action, there would to
a certain extent be a reduction of that expression. The absence of
profit reduces the incentive to create and distribute. If, however,
such expression does exist, and its creator claims a copyright, a
defendant who allegedly violates one of the exclusive rights of the
copyright may argue an affirmative defense 200 to infringement based
on its status as unprotected speech. 201 That affirmative defense
would require the defendant to prove that the expression constitutes
unprotected speech, consistent with the established tenant of First
Amendment law that requires the party seeking to silence a speaker
to show that the disputed speech is unprotected. 202 If the defendant

199. Harms may be overt, such as those which result from child pornography. See New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (observing the physiological, emotional, and mental
harm that results from child pornography). They may also be subtle but nevertheless damaging.
For example, Miller-standard obscenity or false defamatory publications may harm human
dignity or reputational interests. See generally Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright I.aw
2.0, 10 VAND.]. ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 817-20 (2008) (noting harms to females that result from
pornography production).
200. The defense would be an affirmative defense because it would apply only in the
particular instance of the defendant's unauthorized use of the expression. Some unprotected
speech, i.e., obscenity, requires a definition that is based on community standards, and as a
result, the unprotected nature of the speech may vary across the country. See Miller, 413 U.S. at
25. Accordingly, a finding that the author of unprotected speech does not receive copyright
protection in one instance would not necessarily suggest such a finding in another instance.
Unprotected speech would therefore constitute an affirmative defense that would not necessarily
preclude, at least in the case of obscenity, copyright enforcement in different communities.
201. For example, if a website copied and posted a libelous story from a newspaper, the
website would not be liable for copyright infringement if it could establish the applicable
elements for a libel cause of action against the newspaper.
202. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) ("fllt is important to ensure not
only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also that they are applied
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makes that showing in the copyright suit, he would be excused from
the consequences of having infringed. 203
Although this proposal would not affect most expression that
presently receives copyright protection, it would affect a distinct
group of expression that is tied to free speech doctrine. To be clear,
my proposal requires free speech doctrine to define a distinct
boundary of copyright. And this reliance on speech doctrine in
copyright makes sense. The theoretical tie between the Free Speech
Clause and the Copyright Clause is already recognized in the law.
According to the Supreme Court, the Framers viewed copyright as
the engine of free expression. 204 The Court has further recognized
that copyright exists "to promote the creation and publication of free
expression." 205 Copyright represents the economic incentive for
speech production, and in that way, copyright furthers the
marketplace of ideas. Indeed, to the extent that the marketplace
theory underlies the Free Speech Clause, it would also appear to
underlie the Copyright Clause. The Free Speech Clause promotes
ideas into the marketplace by ensuring the absence of government
suppression of a speaker's speech, whereas the Copyright Clause
promotes ideas into the marketplace by ensuring the presence of
government suppression of a copier's speech. Both Clauses exist to
promote the production of speech, which ultimately yields a more

through reliable procedures. This is why we have often held . . . a particular allocation of the
burden of proof . . . to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected
speech."). Placing the burden on the defendant copier would help to ensure that copyright
continue to incent speech at the margins of protection, thereby reducing an unwarranted
chilling.
203. As a practical matter, if the outcome of the copyright suit is a finding that the
disputed expression does not receive copyright protection because it constitutes unprotected
speech, neither the copyright holder nor the defendant likely would continue to disseminate the
expression. Once the copyright action had determined the expression to be unprotected, legal
actions designed to discourage the proliferation of unprotected speech-e.g., a defamation or
obscenity suit-would be much more ripe for prosecution.
204. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889-90 (2012) ("[T]he Framers regarded
copyright protection not simply as a limit on the manner in which expressive works may be
used. They also saw copyright as an engine of free expression: By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.") (internal quotations omitted); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)
("[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.") (quoting Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enter. Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
205. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (emphasis omitted).
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fruitful marketplace. Thus, the purpose of copyright appears tightly
aligned with the purpose of free speech. 206 And their common
purpose suggests a common limitation. That which limits speech
production should apply at least as much in copyright as it does in
free speech.
B. Objections to the Interpretation

Admittedly, this Article does not offer a comprehensive
discussion on whether copyright should extend to expression that
lacks protection under the Free Speech Clause. 207 Much more could
be said on this topic. 208 In this Article I merely observe the
206. Although the purposes of the Free Speech and Copyright Clauses align, there is an
important distinction between the two Clauses. Textually, the scope of expression contemplated
by the Copyright Clause appears narrower than that contemplated by the Free Speech Clause.
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science . . . . ") with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech"). The Copyright Clause sets forth a substantive standard for its
invocation (promoting the Progress of Science) whereas the Free Speech Clause does not. And
this makes sense. Whereas the Free Speech Clause precludes government interference against
speech, the Copyright Clause facilitates a government-created monopoly for speech. Hence,
under the Free Speech Clause, government merely refrains from interfering, whereas under the
Copyright Clause, government actively facilitates. Resources necessary to refrain from
interfering with speech would seem less costly than those required to create and maintain
monopolies. Hence, it makes sense that the Copyright Clause would not cover as broad a group
of speech as the Free Speech Clause.
Whc<;1er Science restricts the Copyright Clause to less expression than that which the
Free Speech Clause protects is a discussion for another day. For present purposes, it suffices to
note that the presence of a term in the Copyright Clause that does not contemplate all
expression (Science) implies that the Copyright Clause must be at least as restrictive as the Free
Speech Clause, which lacks any such term. If both exist to produce speech, but only one contains
a restrictive term, then the Clause with the restrictive term must be at least as restrictive as the
Clause without that restriction. The Copyright Clause appears at least as restrictive as the Free
Speech Clause-if not more so.
207. Space limitations in an article that endeavors to set forth sufficient evidence to
establish a reliable understanding of the original meaning of Science necessarily preclude a
comprehensive discussion regarding whether unprotected speech should receive copyright
protection.
208. For a more comprehensive discussion regarding the policy question of whether
obscenity, and indeed pornography generally, should receive copyright protection, see Ann
Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 1-54 (2012) and Ann Bartow, supra note
199, at 799-840. Professor Bartow argues that pornography lies "beyond the scope of the
Intellectual Property Clause" on the grounds that pornography is "non-progressive and nonuseful." See Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, supra note 208, at 55. She does not, however,
base her constitutional conclusion on the meaning of Science, instead relying on the
conventional interpretation that Science means "knowledge." See id. at 37-38 & n.l80.

310

259

The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause

constitutional tension between the original meaning of Science and
unprotected expression under the Free Speech Clause and I briefly
suggest a proposal to relieve that tension. To that end, I summarily
examine three possible objections to my proposal in this section:
first, the proposal seems to produce greater uncertainty in copyright
law; second, the proposal seems to require subjective views of judges
and juries to determine copyrightable subject matter; and third, the
proposal seems to yield a counterproductive result, the increased
dissemination of unprotected speech.

1. Uncertainty
One objection to my proposal is that it would produce great
uncertainty in copyright law. By importing the complexities of free
speech doctrines into copyright, my proposal arguably muddies the
alread~ murky doctrine of subject-matter eligibility in copyright
law. 20 The definition of unprotected speech is determined on a caseby-case basis. 210 It is anything but certain. Accordingly, defining
copyright eligibility according to the free speech doctrine of
unprotected speech would do nothing to clarify, and indeed might
regress, the morass of confusion over subject-matter eligibility. 211 So
it would seem that importing doctrines of free speech into copyright
would only import greater confusion into the law.
My initial response to this objection is that any uncertainty that
the proposal introduces into copyright would be relatively minimal.

209. See infra note 21 1.
210. See, e.g., McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683 (1976) ("There can be no question
that uncertainty inheres in the definition of obscenity."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (applying community standards of jury to determine definition of obscenity); Alan E.
Brownstein, Rules Of Engagement For Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and
Protected Expression in Anti-abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 553, 624 n.140 (1996) ("Since
the definitions adopted by courts to describe categories of unprotected speech are as ambiguous
as they are, a generic ban will inevitably provide officials and juries considerable opportunity to
pick and choose among the messages that arguably fall within the relevant prohibition."); Peter
E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United
States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1677-78 (1977) (commenting that juries may be
influenced by political views in deciding whether speech is unprotected).
21 1. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Injunctions, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.].
11, 22 (2012) (recognizing the uncertainty in applying the subject-matter doctrine of ideaexpression dichotomy); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683, 684-85 (2012) (noting the "confusion and incoherence" that has developed
in defining the subject matter of copyright).
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It would arise only where expression could be reasonably challenged
as lacking protection under the Free Speech Clause. Only the
arguably obscene or libelous would be subject to the uncertainty of
whether they are in fact obscene or libelous. Most expression
presently eligible for copyright protection would not be affected by
my proposal.
With regard to any uncertainty that Science would impose on
arguably unprotected speech that is in fact protected, that
uncertainty is not necessarily undesirable. This is because the
uncertainty faced by authors of such expression would balance
uncertainty faced by fair users. Users of copyrighted expression face
uncertainty in assessing whether their use is permissible under the
doctrines of fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy. 212 In
choosing to make a fair use or to use an idea underlying expression,
such users are exercising their speech right under the Free Speech
Clause. 213 And the vagueness of these doctrines creates uncertainty
for those users as they attempt to bring their speech to the
marketplace of ideas. 214 In view of this fact, the uncertainty that
some authors would face in assessing whether their works comply
with the meaning of Science would balance the uncertainty that fair
users now face in assessing whether their copying constitutes a fair
use, or similarly, an unprotected idea. Science would therefore bring
balance to existent uncertainty faced by only one side in copyright
law. 215 The balance would help ensure adequate breathing space
necessary for copyright to promote free expression.

212. See Pierre N. Leva!, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07
(1990) (describing the uncertainty surrounding fair use and the resulting reluctance to employ
it); joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 434 (2007) ("The
chilling effect on creative [fair-use] expression has been well-documented. This is exacerbated
by the tendency of copyright owners to take advantage of the uncertainty to pursue aggressive
copyright claims."); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1497-98 (2007) (observing that vagueness of fair use deters permissible uses); Ned Snow,
Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1789-91 (2010)
(explaining uncertainty that inheres in fair use).
213. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (explaining that the fair use and
idea-expression doctrines in copyright constitute accommodations to satisfy First Amendment
speech concerns).
214. See sources cited supra note 212.
215. Of course the uncertainty that copyright holders face would be much less
consequential than the uncertainty faced by fair users: copyright holders would face the
possibility that they would not receive a monopoly reward by misconstruing Science. whereas
fair users would face the possibility of punitive-like financial penalties by misconstruing fairness.
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2. Subjective judicial assessment

A second objection to my proposal is that it would require judges
to impose their subjective beliefs in defining the proper subject
matter of copyright. Under my proposal, judges (or juries) would
define permissible content of copyright based upon their
understanding of whether speech is protectable under the Free
Speech Clause. Arguably this outcome might raise concern given the
warning that Justice Holmes pronounces in Bleistein v. Donaldson: "It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." 216
Doesn't my proposal require judges to be the final arbiters of
expression?
I respond to this objection by first affirming my agreement with
Justice Holmes's admonition. For this reason I argue above that
Science should be interpreted liberally so as to give place for various
works of entertainment that at first glance might not seem to
promote any branch of study. 217 Nevertheless, the nondiscrimination
principle that Holmes preached was not absolute. 218 It included a
limitation. 219 Holmes recognized that content evaluation is indeed
necessary in "the narrowest and most obvious" of cases. 220 And if
any sort of expression represents such a narrow and obvious limit on
copyrightable content, it must be expression that the Free Speech
Clause deems worthy of censorship. Holmes's warning against
content evaluation in copyright law is entirely consistent with
Science as a term that discriminates against content that a judge or
jury deems unprotected speech. Expression that lacks so much value,
to the extent that the law damns it as unprotected speech, represents
the narrowest and most obvious of limits on the nondiscrimination
principle. My proposal is therefore consistent with Justice Holmes's
admonition.~ 21

216.
217.
Copyright
218.
219.
220.
221.

188 u.s. 239, 251 (1903).
See discussion supra Part IV (arguing that Science should be flexibly applied in the
Clause).
See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
See id.
See id.
In another article, I analyze the history surrounding the Progress Clause leading up to
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3. Counterproductive result
A third objection to my proposal is that it might encourage the
production of expression that does not promote Science-i.e.,
unprotected speech. Without a copyright monopoly, unprotected
speech could be freely copied. The absence of any governmentbacked monopoly might therefore encourage the proliferation of that
which Science deems unworthy of promotion.
My initial response to this objection is that it questions the
fundamental premise underlying copyright law-i.e., that a
monopoly of expression will incentivize more and better expression.
The objection assumes that absent a copyright monopoly on
unprotected speech, unprotected speech would proliferate. If this
were true, it implies that absent copyright monopoly on any sort of
speech, that speech would proliferate. And if that were true, there
seems no cause for copyright in the first place. So as an initial
matter, I note the doubtful premise of the objection-i.e., that
copyright does not work. 222
On the merits of the objection, even if it is true that the
dissemination of unprotected speech would increase under my
proposal, this does not represent a reason to misconstrue Science.
Science in the Copyright Clause serves to incent certain sorts of
works through a government-created monopoly system. Yet limited
are government resources to maintain that monopoly system.
Science therefore allocates the limited resources that are necessary to
create and maintain legal monopolies. 223 It discriminates against
unprotected speech in its resource allocation of copyright. 224 That is

and following Bleistein v. Donaldson, in order to demonstrate that Justice Holmes's articulation of
the nondiscrimination principle did not affect the non-copyrightable nature of works that were
obscene, libelous, or otherwise unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. See Snow, supra note 42.
222. See Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, supra note 208, at 38-39 (responding to
economic argument of wider dissemination for unprotected, harmful works by arguing that
benefits of precluding future harm outweigh costs of dissemination of existent works).
223. Cf In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (upholding Congressional
choice to refrain from granting trademark protection to "scandalous" marks under 15 U.S.C. §
1052 (a) on ground that Congress permissibly exercised its judgment regarding expenditure of
public funds to maintain the costly monopoly system of trademark).
224. Cf. Devil Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Once
a court has determined that copyrighted material is obscene, there seems no reason to require it
to expend its resources on behalf of a plaintiff who it could as readily be trying for a violation of
the federal criminal law.").
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all that matters. If unprotected expression proliferates as a result of
the allocation of resources, that fact should not affect the allocation.
C. Test Case
Although most modern courts and commentators have settled on
an anachronistic meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, the
issue is very much alive. A recent case filed in the Northern District
of California, Wong v. Hard Drive Productions, Inc., illustrates this
point. 225 The plaintiff, Liuxia Wong, sought a declaratory judgment
against Hard Drive Productions, Inc. (HDP), stating that she was not
infringin~ on its copyright by allegedly downloading pornographic
images. 2 6 Wong argued that HDP did not have a coEyright in the
images at issue because they constituted obscenity. 27 Ultimately
she prevailed, but the record provided only a one-sentence
judgment. 228 There was no opinion to guide future litigants. 229
Although I believe the judgment was correct, an opinion is
necessary. 230 I therefore provide a brief analysis for the opinion that
the court should have issued in the Wong case. As I discuss below,
the judgment should have turned on the meaning of Science in the
Copyright Clause.
The issue in Wong calls into question a 1979 decision by the
Fifth Circuit, Mitchell Brothers v. Cinema Adult Theater, addressing
whether obscene works are copyrightable. 231 The Mitchell court
provided an opinion that defended the copyrightability of obscene

225. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 10-11, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc.,
No. 5-12-cv-00469-HRL (N.D. Cal. jan. 31, 2012).
226. !d.
227. Id.
228. See Stipulated judgment, Wong, No. 4-12-cv-00469-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012).
229. See id.
230. The necessity of an opinion that clarifies this issue is further evident by judicial
uncertainty over whether copyright applies to obscene, or even pornographic but not legally
obscene, material. See Devil Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
("It is far from clear that the Second Circuit will follow the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting
the argument that obscene material is entitled to copyright protection."); Liberty Media
Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.2 (D. Mass. 2011)
(questioning whether legal hard-core pornography is copyrightable, while refraining from
deciding the issue).
231. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
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works. 232 Although other courts have followed Mitchell, those other
courts have provided minimal analysis on the issue. 233 Mitchell thus
stands as the seminal case for copyrighting obscenity, and by
implication, unprotected speech generally. 234 Hence, a well-reasoned
opinion in Wong should address the points raised in Mitchell.
Fundamental to the Mitchell court's conclusion that obscenity is
copyrightable was its interpretation of the Copyright Clause. 235 The
court interpreted the purpose of the Clause as promoting creativity
and originality, consistent with an understanding of Science as
promoting general knowledge. 236 Creating anything gives rise to
knowledge of something, so even obscenity would fulfill Science's
apparent requirement of creativity-so reasoned the court. 237 In
short, the anachronistic meaning of Science enabled the Mitchell
court to extend copyri~ht protection to an unprotected form of
speech, legal obscenity. 2 8
The flaw of Mitchell lies in the court's explanation that the
purpose of the Copyright Clause is to promote creativity rather than
to promote Science. 239 Only if Science were to mean general
knowledge would creativity work as the purpose of copyright. But
Science does not mean general knowledge. It means the system of
knowledge that comprises branches of study. The correct

232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 404~05 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on
Mitchell to uphold copyright in obscenity); Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Nos. 02 Civ.
3850(HB), 02 (Civ. 6277(HB), 03 Civ. 3379(HB), 2004 WL 2754685, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,
2004) (same).
234. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 49, § 2.17 at 2-197 (describing the court's reasoning in
Mitchell as "the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the [copyrighting obscenity]
issue").
235. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 856, 860 (5th
Cir. 1979).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. It is well recognized that the Authors and Writings terms of the Copyright Clause
require expression to exhibit originality or creativity to be copyrighted. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Those terms, however, do not imply that the purpose of the
Copyright Clause is to promote creativity. They do not imply that Science means creativity.
239. Other flaws appeared in the reasoning of the Mitchell court, including its reliance on
the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supreme Court decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). For an analysis of these flawed aspects of Mitchell, see
Snow, supra note 42.
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interpretation of Science would have changed the court's analysis.
Rather than asking whether obscenity promotes creativity, the
Mitchell court should have asked whether obscenity promotes the
system of knowledge that comprises branches of study. It should
have asked whether society deems obscenity worthy of study. And as
unprotected speech, obscenity could not have been construed as a
subject worthy of study, much less worthy of promotion or even
protection. Under the correct interpretation of Science, Mitchell
should have been decided differently. Accordingly, Wong should have
corrected the reasoning of Mitchell by holding that Science precludes
copyrighting obscenity.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article has established the paucity of historical support for
construing Science in the Copyright Clause as general knowledge or
learning. The evidence suggests a narrower meaning, i.e., a system of
knowledge deriving from branches of study. And that meaning
suggests that Science does not contemplate all content. Content that
is so far removed from the system of study should not fall within the
meaning of Science, and thereby should fall outside the scope of
copyright.
The meaning of Science revealed, courts must either apply it or
account for ignoring it. If they continue to apply it, expression falling
outside the Free Speech Clause should not receive copyright
protection. Courts must recognize that unprotected speech lacks the
value that is necessary for expression to promote the system of
knowledge comprising fields of study. What should not be protected
should not be promoted. Science does not contemplate all
expression.
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